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institutional lenders with inflation during the
1970's has resulted in the almost total diswas once considered to be the conventional
commercial real estate projects. The number
willing to make conventional, long-term, per-
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manent mortgage loans bearing fixed interest rates and providing
for level amortization of principal and interest until maturity diminished severely during the recession of 1974-1975. The hyperinflation which the United States has experienced during the last
several years has furthered that process. Regardless of the interest
rate fixed in the loan documents, the increasing pace of inflation
has made it seem unwise to commit money for a long period of
time to one project when the opportunity would almost certainly
become available in a relatively short period of time to invest that
same money in an alternative form at a higher return.' More importantly, the pace of inflation has become such that lenders increasingly have experienced negative rates of return on their investment in conventional mortgage loans.2
Lenders have been utilizing various alternative financing methods in an attempt to counteract the effect of inflation on their
loans. One widely used method involves imposing a shorter maturity on the loan. Typically, such a loan provides for amortization
based on a thirty-year term, with the loan being due or callable by
the lender at the end of ten or fifteen years. Recent loans of this
type involve even shorter maturities. Another method involves the
"due on sale" clause, used by lenders to impose a new interest rate
reflecting current market conditions at the time a project is sold.
During and after the 1974-1975 recession, many lenders obtained a
nonownership participation in the revenues of various projects.3
Under such a transaction, the lender receives additional interest on
the loan which is based on a percentage of the project's revenues,
calculated with respect to either all of the revenues of the project
1. See generally Strum, Today's Real Estate FinancingClimate-Some of the Causes
and Some of the Problems, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1978).
2. For example, if a lender wished to achieve a real return of 2% per annum on its
invested funds, it would be able to do so at an interest rate of 8% if the inflation rate
averaged 6% per annum. A portion of the interest would offset the reduction in value of the
principal of the loan, and the balance of the interest would represent a real return to the
lender on its investment. If, however, the inflation rate were to increase to 11% per annum,
the lender would realize a negative return of 3% on an 8% loan, because the interest would
cover only a portion of the loss in value of the principal of the mortgage, and the value of
the principal would have been reduced by 3% each year.
3. See generally Strum, Today's Real Estate FinancingClimate-Some of the Causes
and Some of the Problems, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1978). See also Kuklin, Real
Estate FinancingAnd The World We (Will) Live In, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1116
(1978); Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Development, 9 REAL EsT. L.J.
30 (1980).
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or, typically, the increased revenues of the project above an agreed
level. Lenders are currently experimenting with various types of
variable interest provisions, where the interest on the loan is not
fixed at a specified rate but fluctuates (either freely or within prescribed parameters) to reflect changing market conditions." Another technique currently being considered by some lenders is the
shared-appreciation mortgage, where the lender receives additional
interest calculated as a percentage of the project's enhancement in
value either at the time of sale or refinancing of the project or at
stated intervals.5 In the past several years, some lenders have acquired all of the ownership interest in projects to which they commit funds, by purchasing the entire project from a developer and
hiring local firms on a contract basis to provide necessarily local
property management services. Yet another method employed by
lenders attempting to counteract inflation is to own a portion, but
not all, of the ownership interest in projects financed with their
funds. It is this last technique, where lenders own an equity interest in real estate projects in participation with the developer, that
is the concern of this article.
The use of equity participations by lenders as a means of
counteracting inflation has materially affected, sometimes adversely, the usual methods of structuring real estate projects. For
example, it is difficult in such a situation to structure a project in a
manner which utilizes capital raised from individual investors
through private placements of interests in the project if a lender is
insisting on owning a large percentage of the equity ownership.
More dramatically, developers have seen their traditional independence eroded significantly by the large management role which
many lenders insist on having as an integral part of their equity
participation in the project. This article describes various aspects
of the struggle between the lender and developer to reach an agreement regarding the roles which each of them will play in the development, financing, construction, ownership, operation, and sale of
the project in which they are participating jointly.
4. Boykin & Philips, The New Challenger: The Variable-Rate Mortgage, 8 REAL EST.
REV.

83 (1979).
5. See Hayes, Architects of Exotic Mortgages, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1980, at 66-70.
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A. Equity Participationsin General
1. Types of Projects Involved. An equity participation arrangement generally can be used for almost any type of real estate venture. The project may be developed to be held for rental purposes,
for immediate sale as a complete entity, or for sale as condominium units. The exact type of project, as well as the developmental
objectives of the parties, may affect certain decisions made by the
parties and the related advice provided by their counsel. Unless
otherwise noted, this article focuses on certain factors which
should be considered in structuring an equity participation arrangement for a typical garden apartment complex or office building held by the parties for rental purposes.
2. Types of ParticipantsInvolved. The role of the developer in
an equity participation arrangement can be performed by any type
of corporation or partnership, by an individual, or by various other
types of entities.' The role of the participating lender in an equity
participation arrangement can be performed by the same variety of
institutions and entities which typically have provided conventional mortgage financing for real estate projects. This article addresses the types of arrangements which both the lender and developer may select to own their respective beneficial interests and
attempts to call attention to some of the major considerations
which will need to be taken into account by the parties when the
lender desires to extend its role from that of the typical mortgage
lender to that of a participant

in an equity participation

arrangement.
3. Role of the Developer. Activities which typically characterize
the role of the developer are: (1) to conceive the idea of the project;
(2) to supervise and coordinate the necessary legal, accounting, architectural, and other services involved in the development, construction, and operation of the project; (3) to arrange for the
purchase or lease of the land; (4) to supervise the construction of
the improvements; and (5) to supervise the leasing and operation
of the project after completion. In addition, the developer may be
required to commit its own funds to the project. Notwithstanding
economic considerations, the lender may simply want the assur6. Unless otherwise noted, the text assumes that the developer is a regular business
corporation.
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ance that the developer has enough confidence in the project to
commit its own funds to the project. In any case, the lender is willing to become involved in the equity participation arrangement
with the developer because the developer is considered to be better
able, through experience and expertise, to handle these matters
than the lender would be directly.
4. Role of the Lender. The lender's role is to provide all or a
substantial part of the financing required for the development and
construction of the project. Such financing may take the form of
loans or equity contributions, or a combination thereof. Most lenders will also bring a degree of expertise to the development and
operation of the project, based on wide experience with various
types of similar projects. For example, such expertise would include the ability to advise the developer regarding project location,
design, and rental levels in order to achieve maximum marketing
exposure and success and to assist in evaluating subcontractors'
bids.
B.

Objectives of the Parties

1. General Objectives. Developers and lenders exploring the
possibility of entering into an equity participation arrangement
share a mutual objective of pooling their efforts and resources for
the purpose of obtaining-the maximum return on their investment
of money and time. Each party, however, customarily approaches
that mutual objective from a different perspective. The developer
comes from an entrepreneurial tradition, where independence is
considered essential and risk-taking is an accepted price to pay for
the possibility of substantial financial rewards. On the other hand,
the lender comes from an institutional background, where collective and careful review are considered essential and a moderate
rate of return is an accepted price to pay for minimizing the degree
of risk threatening the lender's principal.7 Each party must negotiate a path from its separate starting point to an agreeable accommodation as to the manner in which they jointly will engage in the
proposed project. Therefore, in the course of negotiating, each
7. See generally Hartman, Economics Make Strange Bedfellows: The Institutional
Joint Venture, 2 REAL EST. REv. 62 (1972). As noted in the text accompanying notes 23-25
infra, usury considerations make it particularly important for the lender to assess its position with respect to risk.
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party must move closer to the tradition of the other party in order
to reach a satisfactory agreement and achieve their mutual objective of obtaining the maximum return on their investment.
2. Principal Areas of Conflict. The separate traditions of the
developer and lender usually result in the need for resolving a
number of individual business issues in the course of negotiating
the ultimate form of their agreement. Among the more important
areas of potential conflict are: (1) the type of equity participation
arrangement to be utilized; (2) the ownership interests of the parties; (3) the extent to which the financial commitments of the parties, especially the lender's, will be treated as debt or equity, or
some combination thereof; (4) the relative obligations of the parties to provide financing at particular stages of the project; (5) the
lender's obligation to loan the developer any funds which the developer is required to contribute to the project; (6) the degree to
which the return to the parties on their respective investments will
be guaranteed, cumulative, or simply preferential; (7) the control
each of the parties will have over various aspects of the development and operation of the project; and (8) the extent, if any, to
which the parties will be restricted from engaging separately in
competing activities. While some of these areas of potential conflict are beyond the scope of this article, significant areas of potential conflict and various ways in which such conflicts can be resolved are discussed in detail below.'
3. Designing an Appropriate Structure. In addition to solving
their basic business conflicts, the parties must decide what kind of
legal structure will be utilized for their agreed arrangement. This
decision is two-pronged. First, the type of entity or structure utilized for the ownership of the project must be established. Second,
the type of ownership arrangement used by each party for holding
its interest in the project must be determined. Individual ownership arrangements may be the result of basic business agreements
of the parties. More often, however, they are premised upon individual considerations which are not necessarily affected by the
business agreements of the parties. Selecting the appropriate struc8. For a different perspective on the potential conflicts involved, and some of the legal
issues which arise in connection therewith, see Subcommittee on Debtor-Creditor Problems
of Real Estate Financing Committee, Report: Equity And Debt Participation-Possible
Conflict of Duties, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 509 (1974).
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ture, therefore, may be done before, during, or after the parties
have resolved the major business aspects of their agreement.
C.

Scope and Objectives of Article

1. Arrangements to be Analyzed. Three major types of equity
participation arrangements are discussed in this article. The first
type is referred to as the initial ownership arrangement, in which
the developer and lender join together to own the project at or
before the commencement of construction. The second type is referred to as the convertible mortgage arrangement, in which the
lender does not own any interest in the project initially but has a
right to convert all or part of its mortgage loan into an ownership
interest at some time in the future. The third type is referred to
as the purchase option arrangement, in which the lender does
not own an interest in the project initially but has a'future right
to purchase an ownership interest in the project for additional
consideration. The convertible mortgage arrangement and the
purchase option arrangement share many similarities, as they both
involve the future exercise by the lender of a right to acquire an
ownership interest in the project. The result of the lender exercising this right is the formation of an equity participation arrangement. Consequently, many of the considerations that must be
taken into account in developing the structure for an initial ownership arrangement must also be taken into account in reaching an
agreement on the structure of an equity participation arrangement
which the parties will utilize if the lender exercises its rights under
a convertible mortgage or purchase option arrangement.
2. Objectives of Article. This article has three basic objectives.
The first objective is to identify certain factors which must be considered in choosing the form of entity or structure to own the project. The second objective is to set out certain factors which must
be considered in choosing the ownership arrangement which each
of the parties will utilize to own its interest in the project. The
third objective is to identify certain factors which must be taken
into account by the parties in negotiating various aspects of their
proposed equity participation arrangement.
II.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Certain threshold issues must be addressed and resolved by the
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lender and developer before the decision is made to pursue an equity participation arrangement. Obviously, fundamental business
considerations, such as the potential return on the resources committed to a proposed investment and the risk of loss associated
therewith, should be considered and analyzed prior to making substantial commitments of time and funds. The parties and their
counsel should also examine certain fundamental legal issues in the
formative stages of the transaction. Two important issues are:
(1) whether either party's authority to participate in the proposed
transaction is subject to restrictions; and (2) whether the transaction, if recast as a loan, is usurious.
A.

Authority to Engage in the Transaction

1. Developer's Authority. The only significant restrictions on
the typical developer's authority or capacity to engage in an equity
participation arrangement are those imposed by the documents, if
any, governing the developer's existence and operations.' When the
developer is a corporation or a partnership, a careful review of the
corporate documents or partnership agreement should be undertaken in order to make any required amendments or additions.
This is a relatively simple procedure necessary to insure the authority of the developer to participate in the proposed project.
During the formative state, the developer's counsel should also address any other matters deemed necessary to render an opinion to
the lender regarding the authority of the developer to enter into
the transaction. 0
2. Lender's Authority. Institutional lenders are subject to a
9. See Tax. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. arts. 2.01-.02 (Vernon 1980) (sets out purposes and
powers of a corporation); TRx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 2, 6 (Vernon 1970) (sets
out definition of a partnership). See also Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Vernon

1980) (relates to consideration for indebtedness and authority to make a guarantee, both of
which should be considered).
10. In Texas, this would include, among other things, verifying the corporation's authority to do business and good standing with the Secretary of State and the Comptroller of
Public Accounts, and determining any actions which may be necessary to be accomplished
by the board of directors. The authority and capacity of the partners of a partnershp to
engage in the transaction should be verified. While it would not affect the corporation's,
partnership's, or individual's capacity or authority to enter into the transaction, counsel also
should verify that the assumed name statutes have been complied with to avoid future
problems in that area. See Tax. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.26 (Vernon Supp. 19801981).
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myriad of legislative and regulatory restrictions, which may directly or indirectly affect the lender's authority to engage in an equity participation arrangement.' 1 These controls and restrictions
may also affect collateral issues, such as the negotiating position of
the lender and the operation of the project after it is completed.
For example, national banks may own only such real property as is
necessary for "its accomodations in the transaction of its business.''12 Insurance companies may not own residential real estate in
Texas and are subject to other restrictions which may affect the
timing of their participation in an equity participation arrangement involving undeveloped property that ultimately will be developed for non-residential use.18 Additionally, lenders subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),"
must take into account ERISA's provisions regarding "prohibited
transactions"' 5 and fiduciary standards.'
Considerations collateral to the imposition of restrictions and
control may affect both the structure of the proposed transaction
and the parties' negotiating positions. For example, a bank may attempt to structure the transaction in a manner that will allow it
to utilize the credit for ad valorem taxes assessed on bank real
property against taxes imposed on bank stock.'7 Lenders, subject
11. See generally Hartman, Economics Makes Strange Bedfellows: The Institutional
Joint Venture, 2 RzAL EsT. RzV. 62 (1972); Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity
Investments And The InstitutionalLender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 ForeHAM L. Rav. 579 (1971).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1945). There also are restrictions on the amount that may be invested. See id. § 3371d (Supp. 1980).
13. Tix. INS. CoDE ANN. art. 3.40-1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). It should be noted
that at the time of this writing a bill has been introduced in the Texas Legislature that
would allow insurance companies to own residential real property containing ten or more
living units. (House Bill 870).
14. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
15. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1975) (Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 406-407, 88 Stat. 832
(1974)). See generally Kanner, FinancingIdeas-PensionFund Investment in Real Estate,
8 RAL EST. L.J. 343, 347 (1980). The corresponding provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code are codified at I.R.C. § 4975. The problems that accompany violation of the prohibited
transaction provision include potential civil liability and assessment of excise taxes. For a
detailed discussion of the prohibited transaction and fidiciary responsibility areas, see Lee,
(ERISA)-Fiduciary Responsibilities and Prohibited Transactions, [1975] TAX MNGM'T
(BNA) 308.
16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1975) (Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 401, 411, 88 Stat. 832
(1974)).
17. Tx. Riv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7166 (Vernon 1960). While it is not clear that such a
technique would be successful for the stated purpose, a bank may desire to retain title to
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to ERISA's broad range of prohibited transactions provisions,
must constantly monitor projects in which they are involved, particularly with respect to the relationships between the parties,
their affiliates, and lessees of the project.'" Lenders which are
otherwise tax-exempt will need to determine the extent to which
their participation in the project will give rise to taxable income. 19
Further, corporate lenders considering acquisition of an interest
through a subsidiary should consider the availability of the consolidated return provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). 0
B.

Usury Considerations

Unfortunately, usury questions in equity participation arrangements are often overlooked until one of the following circumstances arises: (1) the developer defaults on some obligation within
the parties' agreement and searches for a defense to its liability; or
(2) counsel for the developer or lender is required, usually at closing, to deliver an opinion letter as to whether the transaction could
be deemed a usurious loan. While a complete analysis of the usury
issue within equity participation arrangements is beyond the scope
of this article, pertinent factors which should be considered are adthe real property upon which the proposed project is to be located and enter into a longterm lease arrangement with the entity developing the property; such entity would include
the bank as a participant. The bank would also be a major tenant of the project. But see
City of Midland v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 607 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso,
1980, writ filed).
18. See generally Lee, (ERISA) -Fiduciary Responsibilities and Prohibited Transactions, [1975] TAx MNGM'T (BNA) 308. The breadth of the prohibitions makes it particularly
important for the lender and developer to explore the question of whether they, their affiliates, lessees, or prospective purchasers of the project fall within any "party-in-interest,"
"fiduciary," or "disqualified person" definitions of the Code or ERISA. "Party-in-interest"
is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14) (1975) (Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(14), 88 Stat. 832 (1974)),
"fiduciary" is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21) (1975) (Pub. L. No. 93-407, § 3(21), 88 Stat.
832 (1974)) and I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3), and "disqualified person" is defined at I.R.C. §
4975(e)(2).
19. See generally Stein, The Unrelated Business Income Tax and Other Tax Considerations, in REALTY JOINT VENTURES: PENSION FUNDS-INsTITUTIONAL INVESTos-DRvmOp.as 411 (Practicing Law Institute) (1980). The cited outline is dated October
22, 1980, which was prior to the enactment of Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 1106 (1980) which
amended I.R.C. § 514(c) by adding subsection (9) thereto, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1980. Of course, a tax exempt lender may be unwilling to give up
any significant tax benefits since that may affect the marketability of its interest in the
project at a future date.
20. I.R.C. §§ 1501-1504.
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dressed below.
The transaction may not be-subject to a usury limit."' If it is, the
parties should structure the transaction in a manner which will
negate a usury problem by either appropriating the funds so that
they do not take the form of a loan, or insuring that the loan is
not subject to or is within applicable usury limitations.2 Notably,
in most situations, the former solution would be the preferred
approach.
A recent analysis of the usury implications of equity participation arrangements suggests that one means to avoid usury restraints is to subject the lender's contribution or loan to risk of
loss.2 8 While logically it may seem that the usual equity participation arrangement encompasses the concept of sharing both economic profits and losses, thereby negating the problem, the tradi24
tional reluctance of lenders to assume substantial risks of loss
necessitates consideration of this factor during the negotiating process. For example, when the lender insists on a guaranteed return
of its capital contribution, guaranteed or cumulative cash flow distributions or capital withdrawals at set rates, construction guarantees, preferred returns on sale or refinancing, and control of the
sale of the project, it may have no substantial risk of loss. Undoubtedly, as the lender's risks decline, the usury question becomes more serious. 2 5 Thus, the parties should scrutinize such
21. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, §§ 501, 511-512, 94 Stat. 132, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 324, 94
Stat. 1647 (preempting, among other things, any usury limitations with respect to residential real property). It should be noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court recently has addressed the validity of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980. The court, upon rehearing, determined that the act was valid and precluded a finding of usury in a situation that otherwise would clearly have been usurious under the Arkansas Constitution. Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., No. 80-254 (Ark. Sup., Feb. 23,
1981). The court had originally held, in an opinion in the same case issued on December 22,
1980, and amended on December 29, 1980, that the act was not valid and that the transaction was usurious.
22. Id. See generally Pedersen & Cox, Choice Of Law And Usury Limits Under Texas
Law And The National Banks Act, 34 Sw. L.J. 755 (1980).
23. Comment, Equity ParticipationIn Texas: A Lender's Dream Or A Usurious
Nightmare?, 34 Sw. L.J. 877, 888 (1980).
24. See generally Hartman, Economics Make Strange Bedfellows: The Institutional
Joint Venture, 2 REAL EST. Rav. 62 (1972); Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity
Financingand the InstitutionalLender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM
L. REv. 579, 586 (1971).
25. Comment, Equity ParticipationIn Texas: A Lender's Dream Or A Usurious
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matters in instances where there are or may be applicable usury
limitations.
III.

CHOICE OF PROJECT ENTITY

Many factors must be considered in selecting the form of entity
or structure to own the project in an equity participation arrangement. Among the more important factors which the form of ownership will affect are: (1) the taxation of the profits of the project,
the ability of the parties to offset income and losses arising from
the project against the results of other activities in which the parties are engaged separately, and the characterization of the mortgage financing provided by the lender as debt or equity for tax
purposes; (2) the extent to which separate activities and assets of
the parties are exposed to or insulated from additional liabilities
arising out of the operations of the project; (3) the reduction or
enhancement of the ability of the parties to exercise control over
the project; (4) the effect, if any, which the form of ownership will
have on the terms and availability of mortgage financing for the
project; (5) the ability to obtain title insurance deemed necessary
for the project by the parties; and (6) the means of admitting additional investors into the project at some point in the future and
the extent to which such admissions are controlled. Each of these
factors is discussed in the context of the basic arrangements for
owning the project ordinarily considered in the course of reaching
a decision on this issue.
A.

Use of a Corporation

1. Tax Considerations. Two primary tax disadvantages are
usually attributed to choosing a corporation to own a real estate
project. One disadvantage is that the losses generated during the
early years of the project's existence can not be directly "flowed
through" to the income tax returns of the developer and lender. 26
The second disadvantage is that the income generated during the
Nightmare?, 34 Sw. L.J. 877, 897 (1980).
26. Operating losses of a regular business corporation would be used to determine the
taxable income of the corporation only, but could be carried forward and applied against

income received by the corporation in subsequent years, subject to the applicable limitations. See I.R.C. §§ 63, 172.
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later years of the project will be subject to double taxation.2 7 In
most
situations, these disadvantages are real and indicate that
some other
form of owning the project should be considered.
In
some situations, however, these disadvantages may be more apparent than real, and careful analysis may indicate that the tax and
other objectives of the parties can be achieved in a satisfactory
manner by using a corporation to own the project.
It should be noted that it is almost never possible to utilize an
electing small business corporation to own the project and thereby
obtain the benefits of subchapter S of the Code.2 The principal
obstacle is that the developer or lender will ordinarily be an entity
which is not eligible to own stock in an electing small business corporation.2 e Another obstacle is that all, or substantially all, of the
income of the corporation will usually be comprised of passive investment income, a fact that will terminate any election made by
the corporation to be treated as a small business corporation. 0
Recently promulgated final regulations under section 385 of the
Code must be considered if the lender is making a mortgage loan
for the project to a corporation in which the lender owns stock. 1
The regulations set forth rules under which purported debt instruments issued by a corporation may be recharacterized as equity
in certain circumstances. 2 Such recharacterization would cause
amounts presumably paid as tax-deductible interest payments on a
mortgage loan to be recast as non-deductible dividends, with principal payments on the loan being recast as distributions subject to
27. Regular corporate income tax ordinarily willobe paid at the time the income is
earned by the corporation which owns the project. The amount distributed by the corporation as a dividend or liquidating distribution will be taxed again as ordinary income or capital gain at the time such amounts are received by the developer or lender as a result of their
stock ownership. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301.
28. Id. §§ 1371-1379.
29. Id. § 1371(a)(2). Only individuals, estates, and certain trusts may own stock in an
electing small business corporation.
30. Id. § 1372(e)(5)(C). It is assumed for purposes of this discussion that "significant
services" are not rendered for the occupant(s) of the project. See Treas. Reg. § 1.13724(b)(5)(b)(vi).
31. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1 to -10 (adopted December 29, 1980, by T.D. 7747). The regulations are generally applicable to, among other things, loans made after April 30, 1981.
They do not apply to loans made pursuant to a binding written agreement in effect on
December 29, 1980, and at all times thereafter. Id. § 1.385-1(a)(1) & (2).
32. The circumstances under which such recharacterization may occur are beyond the
scope of this article.
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the provisions of section 301 of the Code.33 While these rules ordinarily would not apply to a loan made to a corporation in which
the developer has a substantial equity interest,34 great care must
be exercised to assure that any such loan would not be recharacterized as equity with the attendant adverse tax consequences.
One situation in which the use of a corporation as the owner of a
project may be considered is where the parties are not concerned
with obtaining immediate tax benefits by offsetting losses against
their income from other activities. This situation may arise because the parties are tax exempt, have a low effective tax rate, or
have sufficient losses or loss carry-overs from other activities, making any pass-through of losses on the project unnecessary. The parties may be willing, therefore, to let the corporation retain losses
generated by the project during the early years of its existence, and
to utilize those losses as carry-overs against income generated by
the project during the later years of its existence with a view toward selling either the stock of the corporation or the project in a
manner which would enable them to treat the net proceeds of the
sale as long-term capital gains. 5 In the meantime, the net cash
flow of the project would be distributed at times when the corporation did not have any earnings and profits, so that the distributions would be tax-free to the extent of the shareholders' basis in
their stock and treated as long-term capital gains to the extent
they exceeded the shareholders' basis in their stock, assuming the
shareholders satisfied the other requirements for treatment of such
amounts as long-term capital gains.3 In any event, distributions
determined to have been made out of earnings and profits (constituting dividends) would be subject to the 85% dividends received
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c).
34. See id. § 1.385-6 (relating to proportionality). If the developer owns a substantial

equity interest, the instrument evidencing the putative debt held by the lender would not be
considered substantially proportionate to the stock ownership.
35. Presumably the stock of the corporation would be a capital asset. See I.R.C. § 1221.
If the project were sold, the parties would attempt to structure the transaction in a way that
would result in capital gain treatment of the proceeds of the sale. The various considera-

tions which should be taken into account in that regard and methods that may be available
to achieve capital gain treatment are beyond the scope of this article. See generally S.
RIS, REAL ESTATE TAX PLANNING §§

MOR-

5.4-.5 (1977 & Supp. 1979) (presents various matters to

be considered in this respect).
36. See I.R.C. § 301.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss4/4

16

Barton and Morrison: Equity Participation Arrangements between Institutional Lenders a

1981]

EQUITY PARTICIPATION

deduction if received by shareholders who were also corporations, 7
thus double taxation of those distributions would be alleviated
substantially.
The use of a corporation to own the project might also be considered where one of the parties will own 80% or more of the equity interest in the project and is eligible to file consolidated corporate income tax returns.38 If the other party is willing to utilize a
corporation because of its tax status or other concessions which it
receives, the 80% owner can offset the losses generated by the project against its other income by means of filing a consolidated income tax return with the corporation which owns the project. 9 In
this regard, the parties should consider the fact that a corporate
owner of the project immediately could deduct construction period
interest and taxes."°
Any tax advantages that may be obtained by using a corporation
in either of these situations can be obtained equally as well or better by using another form of ownership for the project. In addition,
the factors involved in these two situations do not have wide applicability to most real estate projects. Consequently, lacking other
important reasons for selecting a corporation, tax considerations
usually weigh heavily against utilizing a corporation to own the
project.
2. Liability Considerations.One factor which initially appears
to strongly favor corporate ownership of a project is the extent to
which such a technique insulates other assets and activities of the
parties from liabilities associated with the project.' 1 This same degree of insulation can be achieved, however, by utilizing a corpo2
rate subsidiary to own each party's interest in the project entity.'
To some extent, at least with respect to one of the parties, a degree
37. Id. § 243.
38. Id. §§ 1501-1504.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21.
40. I.R.C. § 163, 189. It is noted that the at risk rules do not apply to the holding of real
property and, therefore, are not discussed in this article. See id. § 465(c)(3)(B). Section
rules, however, should be considered in connection with ownership of an interest in subsidiaries. See Howard & Rosenburg, Temp. Regs. bar use of sub to shirt "at risk" limits on
consolidated returns, 53 J. oF TAx. 6 (1980).
41. See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979 (1971).
42. There may, however, be more of a tendency to "pierce the corporate veil" if the
shareholder is itself a corporation. See Hamiltion, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEXAs L. REV.
979. 989 (1971).
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of insulation can also be achieved by utilizing a limited partnership
to own the project." In addition, insurance is usually available to
cover most liabilities which are of principal concern to the parties.
Consequently, the parties ultimately may not consider this factor
particularly significant in selecting the form of ownership for the
project.
3. Control Considerations. The parties are often concerned
about the extent to which the selection of the form of ownership
affects their ability to control decisions made with respect to the
project. In this regard, using a corporation ordinarily will not be
satisfactory to either party.
If the developer and lender each have 50% of the ownership interest in their equity participation arrangement, the possibility of
a stalemate exists if their 50% ownership interests are comprised
of owning one-half of the stock of a corporation. When either party
owns more than a 50% interest, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the other party to exercise effective control over the routine management of the project or, in some situations, over fundamental decisions affecting the project.
Where a corporation is used to own the project, the members of
the board of directors have control over the routine management
of the project and the corporation, through their election of the
corporate officers to handle day-to-day matters and their decisions
on more important policy matters not requiring shareholder approval. Lacking some type of voting agreement, the party owning
more than 50% of the stock of the corporation is able to elect all of
the directors of the corporation, or, if cumulative voting is in effect, at least a majority of the directors.4 5 Although the minority
shareholder could require, as a condition of the basic agreement,
that the majority shareholder enter into a voting agreement under
which their shares would be voted for specified directors, such
agreements have certain inherent limitations. ' First, the term of
art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); REvisED
§ 303; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.
44. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AT ANN. art. 2.31 (Vernon 1980). For example, at least two-thirds
of the shareholders would have to approve any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation which is not in the ordinary course of
business. Id. art. 5.10.
45. Id. art. 2.29(D).
46. Id. art. 2.30.
43. See TEx.

REv.

Civ. STAT.

ANN.

UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT
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voting agreements is limited to ten years.4 Second, since such
agreements are limited to matters which are properly the subject
of shareholder action and cannot control decisions which are
within the province or the authority of the directors, it is impossible to assure that decisions made by the specified directors will
always be consistent with the limitations the principals seek to impose. Finally, while it is unlikely that the majority shareholder
would be willing to agree to naming an evenly balanced group of
directors in the voting agreement, if it were willing to do so, the
prospect of reaching a stalemate at the board of directors level
would remain.
The minority shareholder could ameliorate some of the inherent
limitations of a voting agreement by also requiring, as a condition
of the basic agreement, that the majority shareholder agree to a
super-majority quorum requirement for actions by the board of directors, so that the minority shareholder could keep its directors
away from meetings of the board of directors, thereby denying the
majority the quorum needed to pursue or continue a course of action which the minority shareholder found objectionable. The twosided nature of such a provision would, of course, have to be emphasized strongly by counsel to a minority shareholder seeking advice on such matters.
A minority shareholder can usually gain more effective control
over fundamental decisions affecting the corporation and the project than it can over routine management decisions. Such control
can be obtained by: (1) acquiring sufficient stock to veto actions
requiring more than a simple majority vote under corporate law;48
(2) insisting on a sufficiently higher voting requirement in the articles of incorporation with respect to specified matters so that the
percentage of stock which it does obtain results in a veto power;
(3) negotiating a voting agreement under which it effectively is
given a veto power over decisions requiring shareholder approval;
or (4) requiring that the articles of incorporation be written so that
certain matters which would ordinarily be within the province of
47. Id. art. 2.30.
48. E.g., id. art. 4.02 (amending the articles of incorporation); id. art. 5.03 (approval of
a merger or consolidation); id. art. 5.10 (disposition of assets other than in the ordinary
course of business); id. art. 6.03 (dissolution).
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the board of directors require shareholder approval.4 '
As suggested, a minority owner's desire to insure participation in
the control of the project owned by a corporation may involve
cumbersome solutions, with attendant additional legal costs. This
problem, in most cases, can be solved more easily by utilizing other
forms of ownership.
4. Effect on Mortgage Financing.Until recently, usury considerations often made it important to use a corporation, at least
nominally, to own real estate projects.5 0 Statutes were enacted in
Texas in 1977 and 1979 which removed the usury distinction between a corporate borrower and individual or partnership borrowers with respect to most real estate projects."' Further, the recent
enactment of the federal preemption statute52 has diminished, if
not eliminated, the usury aspects of the choice between a corporation and other arrangements for owning a real estate project.
One instance, in which the use of a corporation may be significant in connection with mortgage financing, relates to the question
of what relationship exists when the lender which makes a mortgage loan for a real estate project is also an owner, directly or indirectly, of a substantial interest in the project encumbered by the
mortgage. Unlike certain other ownership arrangements, the use of
49. E.g., id. art. 2.15(B) (fixing the consideration for shares without par value); id. art.
2.23 (amending the bylaws); id. art. 509 (authorizing mortgages and sales in the ordinary
course of business).
50. The maximum allowable interest rate for corporations under Texas law was 11/2 %
per month, or 18% per annum, while the maximum rate for individuals and partnerships
was 10% per annum. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302-2.09, 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
Accordingly, if the market interest rates were above 10% per annum, it was necessary to
form a corporation to borrow the mortgage financing, providing for interest at a rate in
excess of 10% per annum. A corporation which was used to hold legal title to the real estate
for purposes of obtaining a mortgage loan in excess of the rate applicable to individuals or
partnerships often proved a poor choice for federal income tax purposes if the corporation
was intended solely as a nominee, with the parties intending that the tax benefits from
ownership of the property pass through to the beneficial owners thereof. See, e.g., 1 W.
MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
3.10 (1977); Baker & Rothman, Straw corporations: New cases shed light on tax-recognition criteria, 45 J. OF TAX. 84 (1976). The position of the Internal Revenue Service on this
issue is generally that the intended flow-through will not work, as clearly set forth in recent
technical advice memoranda issued by the national office. See Private Letter Rul. 8105040
(Oct. 31, 1980).
51. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
52. See note 21 supra. Certain limits still apply, however, with respect to non-residential real estate loans.
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a corporation should result in a clear distinction between the role
of the lender as a lender and the role of the lender as an owner of
an equity interest in the project. The fact that the corporation, and
not its shareholders, is the debtor with respect to the mortgage
financing precludes the sort of ambiguity as to the relative rights
and obligations of the developer, lender, and third-party creditors
which may exist with other forms of ownership if the revenues of
the project are insufficient to satisfy the debt service on the mortgage financing.58
5. Effect on Title Insurance. The use of a corporation to own
the project may offer limited benefits to the parties with respect to
title insurance on the project. The principal concern with respect
to title insurance in an equity participation arrangement is that
one of the parties will have knowledge concerning a title problem
which is not disclosed to the title insurer, thereby relieving the title insurer of liability under the title insurance policy should there
54
be a failure of title because of the known but undisclosed defect.
This problem is of particular importance to the lender since the
developer is usually the party most familiar with the project site
and related potential title problems.
If a corporation is used to own the project, an argument can be
made that, although the knowledge of an officer of the developer
concerning an undisclosed title defect would be attributed to the
developer, such knowledge should not be attributed to the corporation owning the project based solely upon the developer's stock
ownership in that corporation, because a shareholder, as such, ordinarily is not considered to be an agent of a corporation." An
53. As noted in succeeding portions of this article, the position of the lender and its
mortgage financing may become somewhat unclear if the ownership of the project is held in
a co-tenancy, limited partnership, or joint venture. The fact that a properly organized and
maintained corporation will be regarded as a distinct legal entity separate and apart from
its shareholders should avoid the questions regarding such matters which may arise in connection with other forms of ownership.
54. The Texas State Board of Insurance is authorized to promulgate forms for title
insurance in Texas. Tax. INs. CODE ANN. art. 9.07 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Pursuant to
that authority, the Board of Insurance has adopted Form T-1, "Owner Policy of Title Insurance" (July 1, 1980), which excludes from coverage any liens or other defects which are
"known to the Insured at the date of this policy unless disclosure thereof in writing by the
Insured shall have been made to the Company prior to the date of.

.

. [the] . . . pol-

icy. . . " "Insured" is defined as the named insured and various successors in interest. A
similar exclusion is contained in the policy form for a mortgagee's policy. Id.
55. See Atlas Petroleum Corp. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 5 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ.
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argument can also be made that such knowledge should not be
imputed to the corporation which owns the project, even if the
officer of the developer who possessed the knowledge also becomes
an officer of the corporation owning the project, because such
knowledge was not acquired as a representative of that corporation.56 Consequently, it is possible that a lender may obtain greater
protection from undisclosed title defects if the project is owned
by a corporation rather than another form of ownership arrangement. There is no assurance, however, that a lender could obtain
complete protection from such undisclosed title defects which are
known to an officer of the developer, and a court may apply equitable principals
to deny recovery from the title insurer in such
57
instance.
6. Effect on Admitting Investors. It is possible that either
party may wish to structure their equity participation arrangement
to allow flexibility to admit new investors for purposes of providing
capital to cover unanticipated cost overruns, operating deficits, or
to recover capital initially invested in the project after it has been
completed and initially leased. Because of the inability to "flow
through" tax benefits to the beneficial owners of a project owned
by a corporation, the parties will not be able to attract investors by
means of emphasizing the tax benefits attributable to such investment. In addition, it is unlikely that investors will be readily available whose tax situation is such that they can ignore the tax benefits which are presented by alternative offerings and invest in a
particular project solely on the basis of the economics of the project itself.
One benefit which the use of a corporation does provide is that
the lender and developer can be somewhat less concerned about
the ancillary consequences of admitting new investors than they
might be in the context of another ownership arrangement. Since
the new investors will not be able to bind the lender and developer
to unanticipated liabilities, the admission of new stockholders
should give the lender and developer little or no concern as long as
App.-El Paso 1928, writ ref'd); Itasca Roller Mill & Elevator Co. v. Wooten, 246 S.W. 678
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1922, no writ). But see Searle-Taylor Mach. Co. v. Brown Oil Tools,
Inc., 512 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

56. See Taylor v. Callaway, 27 S.W. 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ dism'd).
57. See Searle-Taylor Mach. Co. v. Brown Oil Tools, Inc. 512 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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they maintain sufficient stock ownership to have effective control
over the election of directors.58
7. Summary of Considerations. Although there may be some
situations in which the use of a corporation to own the project in
an equity participation arrangement may have certain advantages,
the use of a corporation generally provides few, if any, advantages
and a number of significant disadvantages. In most instances,
therefore, the parties will consider other types of ownership
arrangements.
B.

Use of a Limited Partnership

1. Tax Considerations.Unlike a corporation, use of a limited
partnership would enable the lender and developer to "flowthrough" the tax benefits of the ownership of the project during
the early years of its existence to offset other income of the parties
from separate activities." Any income from operations of the project during the later years of its existence would be "flowedthrough" to the partners without incurring double taxation. 0 Because of increasing principal amortization on the mortgage financing and declining depreciation deductions, a potentially adverse result of this latter feature is that taxable income allocated to the
partners through the partnership normally begins to exceed the
cash flow distributed to the partners in the later years of the project's existence. The parties usually contemplate, however, that the
project will be sold when this "cross-over" point is reached. The
parties also anticipate that the profit realized on a sale of the project at that time will be taxed at long-term capital gains rates, subject to recapture as ordinary income of the portion of the gain
equal to any depreciation which has been claimed in excess of
58. Minority shareholders do have various rights in connection with corporate matters;
however, such rights are generally not sufficient to block corporate action if the stock ownership is not more than one-third of the stock entitled to vote on the specific matter. See note
48 supra.
59. See I.R.C. § 702(a). Although there may be some variation, the textual discussion

assumes that the lender is the limited partner and the developer is the general partner. For
an overview of the conduit theory of taxation of partnership operations, see 1 W. McKEE,
W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1 1.01 (1977); S.
MORRIS, REAL ESTATE TAX PLANNING § 4.1 (1977); 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §
6.01 (1976).
60. See I.R.C. § 702(a).
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straight-line depreciation." ' In general, therefore, the tax consider-

ations of using a limited partnership to own the project are
favorable.
There are some troublesome tax areas, however, which must be
taken into account. A threshold question which must be resolved

favorably before a limited partnership can be used to own the project involves assuring that the partnership will be classified as a
partnership for tax purposes and not as an association taxable as a
corporation." Obtaining this assurance requires an analysis of the
four major corporate characteristics of continuity of life, centralization of management, free transferability of interests, and limited

liability in order to determine that the proposed limited partnership does not possess more than two of these corporate
characteristics."
a. Continuity of Life. Ordinarily, a limited partnership formed
under a statute substantially conforming to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act will not possess the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life, because the dissolution of the general partner
will result in the dissolution of the partnership."" The fact that the
limited partners may agree to reform and continue the partnership
by appointing a new general partner will not adversely affect this
conclusion."
b. Centralization of Management. A limited partnership does
not possess the corporate characteristic of centralization of management unless the limited partners own substantially all of the
beneficial interest in the partnership." Consequently, when the de-

61. See id. §§ 702(a), 1250.
62. Compare I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (defines partnership as "a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on .

.

... specifically excluding a corporation, trust,

or estate) with id. § 7701(a)(3) (defines corporation as including "associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies"). See generally S. MORRIS, REAL ESTATE TAX PLANNING § 4.5 (1977 & Supp. 1979) (discusses general considerations applicable to this area).
63. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.
64. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 21 (Vernon 1970); REVISED UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20. Texas incorporated the Uniform Limited Partnership Act in article 6132a. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132a (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).

65. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b).
66. See id. § 301.7701-2(c). It should be noted, however, that the Service recently has
proposed regulations which would make the centralization of management issue a factual
question if all or part of the limited partners are able to remove a general partner. The
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veloper owns a significant interest in the partnership, and the developer and lender are independent, this characteristic is not ordinarily present. If, however, the developer's interest is relatively
small or is subordinated to cash flow and liquidation preferences in
favor of the lender to such an extent that the developer may actu-

ally not receive any distributions from the partnership, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) may take the position that substantially all of the beneficial interest in the partnership is held by the
lender and that the corporate characteristic of centralization of

management does exist.6 7 A similar position may be taken if the
lender owns a significant equity interest in the developer. In this
regard, it should be noted that the Service will not issue a
favorable advance ruling with respect to the partnership status of a
limited partnership with a sole corporate general partner if the
limited partners own more than 20% of the stock of the corporate
general partner.6 8

Although the problem of centralization of management should
not arise initially, where the developer and lender are completely

independent, it should be borne in mind when negotiating the
agreement between the parties and in the future conduct of the

arrangement.6 9 The problem of having the partnership treated as
an association taxable as a corporation may be avoided if the problem is recognized at or prior to the time it arises. The danger, how-

ever, is that the problem would not be timely perceived. The opportunity for avoiding the adverse tax consequences of the changed

classification of the partnership to a corporation could be lost for
proposed regulations state that: "A substantially restricted right of the limited partners to
remove the general partner (e.g., in the event of the general partner's gross negligence, self-

dealing, or embezzelment) will not itself cause the partnership to possess centralized management." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4), 45 Fed. Reg. 70909 (1980).
67. See id. § 301.7701-2(c).
68. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. Although the Service has taken this position
in the area of advance rulings, where it has considerable discretion, the standard is not
expressly applicable to audits. It may well be applied by an agent, however, at least tacitly,
in an examination of the partnership's tax return.
69. For example, a lender which requires a pledge of the developer's stock to secure the
performance of the developer's obligations to the lender or guarantees of those obligations
by the developer's shareholders may find itself in the awkward position of endangering the
classification of the partnership for tax purposes if it should foreclose such pledge and acquire ownership of the stock. See id. A similar problem could arise if the lender obtains a
pledge of the developer's partnership interest and that interest is acquired by a subsidiary
of the lender upon foreclosure.
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several years, or even permanently, and additional taxes and interest needlessly incurred.7 °
c. Free Transferability of Interests. The concern of both the
developer and lender to avoid having to deal with parties other
than the ones with whom they reach their initial agreement often
results in such controls over transfers of interest in the partnership
that there will be no danger of the partnership's having the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests.7 1 In some
cases, however, one of the parties, usually the lender, will have sufficient bargaining strength to be able to negotiate fairly liberal
terms with regard to transferability of interests in the partnership.
In addition, lenders may be subject to regulatory requirements regarding liquidity of such investments which prevent them from
agreeing to stringent restrictions on transfers of interests in the
partnership.7 2 As a result, a lender may not be able or willing to
agree that transfers of its limited partnership interest will require
approval of the developer general partner of the type which would
ordinarily be utilized to avoid the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests.
The classification regulations draw a distinction between the
ability simply to transfer an interest in a limited partnership to an
assignee, which can be done without approval of the other partners, and the ability to designate an assignee as a substitute limited partner, which requires the approval of the other partners. 8
This distinction is often overlooked, and may not be acceptable to
a lender which desires or is required to be in a position of tranferring its entire limited partnership interest to a transferee which
will be entitled to be admitted as a substitute limited partner with70. For example, gain might be realized at the time of the change in classification, elections on matters such as accelerated depreciation could be lost, taxes could be incurred at
the partnership/association level, distributions to the lender could be treated as dividends,
and other related problems could occur. See generally 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS V 3.01[31 (1977).
71. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e).
72. For example, the authors have been advised that the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board imposes such a requirement in the course of approving joint venture investments by
federal savings and loan associations. In addition, lenders subject to the "prudent man" rule
of ERISA may be under an obligation to preserve the liquidity of such investments, although the requirements of such rule in this area are not yet well-established. See Kanner,
Financing Ideas-PensionFund Investment in Real Estate, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 343 (1980).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
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out the approval of the developer general partner.
d. Limited Liability. Limited liability may be the most difficult
characteristic to overcome in certain situations. Under the classification regulations, this characteristic does not exist unless the general partner has no significant assets and is acting merely as the
agent of the limited partners. 4 The fact that the liabilities of the
partnership may be far greater than the assets of the developer
general partner does not require an adverse result under the classification regulations so long as the developer general partner has
significant asets which may be reached by creditors. 7 5 In most
cases, developers chosen by lenders for equity participation arrangements have significant assets. Similarly, developers typically
insist on having an ownership interest and control rights sufficient
to negate a conclusion that the developer general partner is acting
as the agent of the lender limited partner. It is possible, of course,
for developers to suffer financial reverses. If that should occur,
where the developer has a relatively small interest in the partnership and the lender has negotiated severe restrictions with respect
to the actions which the developer can take without the lender's
approval, it is possible the nature of the partnership would have
changed sufficiently that the corporate characteristic of limited liability would exist. If the partnership then possessed at least two
other of the major corporate characteristics, it would be subject to
reclassification as an association taxable as a corporation with the
attendant adverse tax consequences."
An equally troublesome problem regarding the concept of limited liability is the position of the Service that it will not issue a
favorable advance ruling with respect to the partnership status of a
limited partnership which has a sole corporate general partner,
unless the general partner has a net worth equal to an amount
which is at least 15% of the limited partners' contributions up to
$2,500,000 or at least 10% of the limited partners' contributions if
the limited partners' contributions exceed $2,500,000. 7 7 Although
this requirement does not appear on its face to be unduly onerous,
several aspects of the Service's position in this regard are particu-

74. See id.

75. See id.
76. See id.

§

301.7701-2(d)(1).

§ 301.7701-2(d)(1).
§ 301.7701-2(a)(3).

77. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
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larly troublesome. In calculating the net worth of the developer, its
assets are valued at their fair market value, which seems equitable.
Assets comprised of the developer's interest in and accounts receivable from the limited partnership in question, as well as its interests in and accounts receivable from similar limited partnerships, however, are excluded from the computation of the general
partner's net worth for purposes of satisfying this requirement.
Consequently, a developer which has been active in limited partnership syndications and limited partnership equity participation
arrangements and has few assets other than its interests in such
partnerships may have difficulty meeting this net worth requirement. Although this is a condition for issuing advance rulings and
not an explicit audit guideline, the parties would be more secure
that the partnership lacks the corporate characteristic of limited
liability if this net worth requirement is satisfied by the developer
at the outset. Care must be taken to assure that the developer
maintains such net worth throughout the existence of the partnership, in order to avoid an inadvertent reclassification of the partnership as an association taxable as a corporation.7
Assuming that the parties are satisfied that the partnership initially will be classified as a partnership for tax purposes, and have
taken appropriate steps to minimize the risk of an inadvertent
reclassification of the partnership as an association taxable as a
corporation in the future, they will still need to consider other tax
aspects of a limited partnership, including the question of whether
*mortgage financing provided by the lender will be treated as debt
or equity for tax purposes. As most of these issues relate to any
type of partnership which is used to own the project, and may not
relate directly to the question of choosing a limited partnership
vehicle to own the project, they are discussed below.
2. Liability Considerations. A major inducement for a lender
to utilize a limited partnership as the ownership vehicle for the
project is the extent to which a lender may minimize its liability as
a limited partner. Although it is generally true that a lender may
be insulated from liability as a limited partner in a manner which
is unavailable in the context of other ownership arrangements,

78. Id.
79. See generally 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R.
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1 3.07 (1977).
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there are some qualifications regarding this general rule which
must be kept in mind.
The Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act (TULPA)80 provides that a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of the
limited partnership beyond the amount of its agreed capital contributions, unless the limited partner receives a distribution of capital from the limited partnership or takes part in the control of the
business of the limited partnership. 1 Each of these exceptions to
the general rule of limited liability should be considered by a
lender in choosing and negotiating the structure of a limited partnership arrangement to own the project.
Under the TULPA, a limited partner which receives a distribution of capital from the limited partnership is liable to return the
amount distributed, plus interest, if necessary to satisfy creditors
whose claims arose prior to such distribution."2 It appears that
most net cash flow distributions made during the early years of the
project's existence may be deemed to have been made from capital,
because the partnership would not have realized income for either
tax or accounting purposes from which such distributions could be
claimed to have been made. 83 This treatment is usually inconsistent with the view of the parties, in that they distinguish between
distributions of net cash flow, viewed as distributions of operating
revenues, regardless of whether they are treated as such for either
accounting or tax purposes, and distributions of the proceeds of
capital transactions such as sale or refinancing which are considered the real distributions of capital. Nevertheless, if cash flow distributions are treated as distributions of capital for purposes of the
TULPA, a lender which had made all of the capital contributions
which it had agreed to make under the limited partnership agreement may be liable for what it considers additional capital contributions. Although this result might be avoided by filing an

80. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
81. See id. §§ 3, 18 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See also REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 403; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9.
82. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 18(B)(2)(d) (Vernon 1970). See also
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 608(a); UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 17(4).

83. The tax and accounting losses are often generated by non-cash items such as depreciation. Thus, there may be positive cash flow distributions accompanied by tax or accounting losses.
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amended limited partnership certificate to reduce the limited partner's capital contribution obligation each time a distribution of net
cash flow or the proceeds of a capital transaction is made, such a
technique appears vulnerable because the claims in question
would
84
amendment.
the
and
distributions
the
have arisen before
There has been a great deal of confusion for many years as to
the extent to which limited partners may control the actions of
general partners without being found to have participated in the
control of the limited partnership within the meaning of the
TULPA. In 1975, the Texas Supreme Court held that mere participation in the control of the limited partnership's business is sufficient by itself to render limited partners liable to creditors as general partners, and that the creditors need not show that they relied
on the authority of the putative limited partner to act as a general
partner.85 This holding was criticized as being inconsistent with
the purposes of the TULPA and it was legislatively overruled in
1979 by amending section 8 of the TUPLA to require that the person transacting business with the partnership reasonably believe
that the limited partner is a general partner."' Even in light of the
amendment, however, lenders need to be concerned about the extent of control which they can clearly exercise under the TULPA
as limited partners without being open to a charge by a creditor
that certain actions constituted taking part in the control of the
limited partnership's business and that the creditor reasonably believed that the the lender acted as a general partner.
The TULPA was amended in 1979 to provide that certain actions on the part of limited partners do not constitute taking part
in the control of the business of the partnership.8 There are, however, certain areas of concern in this regard. Among the more important omissions from the list of permitted actions by limited
partners is the right to remove the general partner, either with or
84. The technique described in the text also may be objectionable from the developer
general partner's view. If the technique worked as against third-parties, it also should work
as against the developer general partner, thereby taking away some assets that may otherwise have been available to satisfy the third party before the third party is entitled to seek
satisfaction from the developer general partner's separate assets.
85. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
86. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(a), 8, comment (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
The comment states that the creditor would normally have to show that the limited partner
has been involved in the day-to-day management of the partnership. Id. § 8, comment.
87. See Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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without cause. Although an argument can be made that such right
is so fundamental as to not require elaboration in the TULPA, 8 it
is possible that a court could conclude that the exercise, or even
the existence, of such a right on the part of the limited partners
constitutes taking part in the control of the business of the partnership. The danger of this conclusion appears greatest where the
right to remove the general partner is either at the discretion of
the limited partners or is based on some sort of performance standards and such right is not limited to situations where the general
partner is guilty of fraud or malfeasance in the performance of its
duties as general partner.
An issue which is of specific concern to lenders in evaluating the
use of a limited partnership to own the project is the extent to
which the exercise, or existence, of rights to approve specific actions regarding the project will constitute taking part in the control of the business of the limited partnership. Included among
these actions are requirements for lender approval of matters such
as construction contracts and subcontracts, operating budgets,
rental rates, lease terms, property management contracts, insurance coverages and issuers, and maintenance and service contracts.
It appears that most activities such as these would constitute such
a regular part of the business of the limited partnership that the
general partner ordinarily would be authorized to make determinations on these issues subject only to rather broad restrictions, such
as limitations with respect to contracts and transactions with affiliates. In the event that the lender insists on participating in decisions of this nature, it would appear to do so at the peril of being
found to have participated excessively in the control of the business of the limited partnership.
For the foregoing reasons, a lender may determine that the potential for limited liability within the context of a limited partnership is either uncertain or would require accepting too many restrictions on its ability to participate in decisions regarding the
project considered to be vital from a business standpoint. The
88. But cf. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8, comment (Vernon Supp. 19801981) (wherein it is stated that the inclusion of the right of the limited partners to remove
the general partner may create so much "continuity of existence" as to deny partnership
treatment for tax purposes). The comment will be proven correct, in some respects, if Prop.
Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) is adopted, although the proposed regulation deals with centralization of management rather than continuity of life. See note 66 supra.
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lender may conclude, therefore, that it would prefer to incur the
straightforward liabilities to which it would be exposed as a member of a general partnership" in lieu of attempting to limit its liability by trying to force itself into a mold inconsistent with what it
considers to be its legitimate business needs.
3. Control Considerations. The degree to which a limited partnership gives the parties flexibility to control various actions with
regard to the project is related directly to the liability aspects of a
limited partnership. Subject to the possibility that the lender limited partner might be exposed to liability as a general partner if it
participates excessively in the control of the limited partnership's
business, 90 it is generally possible for the parties to reach an appropriate agreement with respect to the degree to which various decisions can be made by the developer general partner without approval of the lender limited partner.
A question does exist under the TULPA as to the extent to
which the developer and lender can reach an agreement in an initial limited partnership agreement regarding the terms and conditions under which the project can be sold or refinanced by the developer without the further approval of the lender limited partner.
While the TULPA allows the project to be sold or refinanced at
any time on terms and conditions approved by a majority of the
limited partners, it is not clear whether this approval must be
given at the time an actual transaction is being considered or can
be given in advance.' 1 A total advance and non-specific delegation
of authority on this matter by the lender limited partner to the
developer general partner would be of questionable validity. In
some instances, however, the lender limited partner may agree in
advance on specific terms under which the developer general partner would be authorized without further approval of the lender to
sell or refinance the project. Since the TULPA does not expressly
sanction such advance agreements, they may be subject to challenge. If the lender limited partner subsequently did challenge the
validity of such an agreement, however, it presumably would be
89. See TEx. Rzv. Cv.
AcT
90. See TEx.
REVISED UNIFORM
91. See TNx.
PARTNERSHIP

STAT. ANN. art.

6132b, § 15 (Vernon 1970). See also UNIFORM

§ 15.

Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See also
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 403; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9.
REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b)(5)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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liable for damages for its breach.
4. Effect on Mortgage Financing. Under section 14 of the
TULPA, there is considerable doubt as to the validity of a mortgage granted by a limited partnership to a lender which is also a
limited partner of the mortgagor limited partnership.' 2 Although it
may be argued that section 14 of the TULPA was not intended to
invalidate the granting of a mortgage to a lender which was a limited partner unless the partnership was insolvent at the time the
mortgage was granted, such conclusion is not clearly supported.
There are no Texas cases which state that section 14 of the
TULPA does not mean what it purports to say, which is that no
limited partner may receive partnership property as collateral security for a loan to or claim against the partnership. Cases in other
jurisdictions and most commentators, however, have concluded
that provisions corresponding to section 14 of the TULPA do not
invalidate a mortgage granted to a lender limited partner as long
as the limited partnership is solvent at the time the mortgage is
created.93
Assuming that section 14 of the TULPA does not invalidate the
creation of a mortgage by a solvent limited partnership in favor of
the lender limited partner, this provision casts doubt on the validity of the limited partner's continuing to hold the mortgage once
the limited partnership- subsequently becomes insolvent. 4 Likewise, doubt is raised regarding the validity of payments made by
the limited partnership on the debt secured by the mortgage at a
time when the partnership has become insolvent.
In addition to the question of the validity of the mortgage, there
is some ambiguity in the provisions of the TULPA regarding the
relative priority of claims of the lender limited partner and unsecured creditors. Section 14 of the. TULPA says that a limited
92. See id. § 14(a)(1) (Vernon 1970). See also REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
§ 303; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13(1)(a).
93. See Hughes v. Dash, 309 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying Florida law); Grainger
v. Antoyan, 313 P.2d 848 (Cal. 1957); A.T.E. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Corson, 268 A.2d 73, 74
(N.J.Ch. 1970); A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIPS § 93, at 550 (1968);
19 R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19 (Texas Practice 1973); Krotovil & Werner,
Fixing Up The Old Jalopy-The Modern Limited PartnershipUnder The ULPA, 50 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 51, 62 (1975); Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments
And The Institutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
579, 603 (1971).
94. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 14 (Vernon 1970).
ACT
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partner is on a parity with general creditors of the limited partnership with respect to claims which the limited partner has against
the limited partnership.9 5 Section 24 of the TULPA implies, however, that secured claims of a lender limited partner are to be accorded their normal priority over the unsecured claims of general
creditors.9" This apparent ambiguity can be resolved in two possible ways. First, if section 14 is interpreted literally, a limited partner could never be a secured party, so the question of priority of
its apparently secured claims would not arise. Second, section 14,
read in conjunction with section 24, could be interpreted to mean
that it is only unsecured claims of limited partners which are on a
parity with general creditors, implicitly sanctioning the granting of
security and attendant priority, as long as the limited partnership
is solvent when the security is granted."'
It should be noted that, if the lender limited partner's mortgage
is invalidated because of the provisions of section 14, it should only
affect the lender's priority with respect to claims against the partnership. The invalidity of the mortgage should not extend the liability of the lender limited partner for the debts of the partnership
beyond that for which it would otherwise be liable. 8
5. Effect on Title Insurance. The possibility of encountering title defects regarding the project with respect to which the title insurer may deny liability because of the undisclosed knowledge of
such defects by the developer appears to be most acute in the context of using a limited partnership to own the project. Knowledge
of an officer of the developer is attributed to the developer, and,
consequently, may be attributed to the limited partnership when
the developer is the general partner. 9
From a developer's perspective, this potential title insurance

95. See id. § 14(a).
96. See id. § 24(a)(1).
97. See generally Hecker, The Revised ULPA: Provisions Affecting The Relationship
Of The Firm And Its Members To Third Parties, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1979).
98. See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Investments And The Institutional
Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 607 (1971). See also
Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, §§ 8, 18 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981).
99. See City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. 1969) (knowledge of
corporate officer attributed to corporation). See also TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a,
§ 10(a) & art. 6132b, § 12 (Vernon 1970) (knowledge of a partner acting for the partnership
which was acquired prior to becoming a partner will be attributed to the partnership when
such knowledge was present in the mind of the acting partner).
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problem is minimal in the context of a limited partnership. Since a
limited partner ordinarily is not considered to be an agent of the
limited partnership, the undisclosed knowledge which officers and
directors of the lender may have with respect to title defects affecting the land on which the project is constructed should not be attributed to the limited partnership.100
6. Effect on Admitting Investors. A limited partnership is a
suitable vehicle for the parties to use in order to preserve their
flexibility to admit additional investors in the future.10 Investors
admitted as limited partners do not have the same power to bind
the partnership or the other partners to unanticipated obligations
as they would in a general partnership. Although the developer
and lender may have some concern about the necessity of dealing
with new limited partners on issues requiring approval by the limited partners,/'0 this factor is usually of less importance than the
ability of the new partners to bind the partnership or the other
partners to unanticipated obligations. 03
Even if the parties are reluctant to deal with new limited partners, it may be possible, in some situations, to ameliorate this apprehension. For example, where the developer general partner and
the lender limited partner each own a 50% interest in the partnership, the lender may be willing to allow the developer to transfer a
substantial portion of its interest to new limited partners since the
lender controls a majority of the limited partnership interest for
100. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). As
previously noted, it would be unusual, in any event, for the lender to have knowledge of any
title defects since, in the normal transaction, the lender is not as involved in the procurement of the property as the developer.
101. See id. §§ 9, 10(a)(6) (Vernon 1970). A limited partner can assign its interest in
the limited partnership in order to transfer its share of profits and other compensation.
Unless approved by all the members, such assignment does not give the assignee all the
rights of a limited partner. See id. art. 6132a, § 20 (Vernon 1970); REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 702, 704; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 19. See also Tax. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, §§ 8, 10-11 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980-1981) (regarding general
rights of limited partners that may cause the parties some concern).
102. See Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). In
addition, limited partners have the same rights as a general partner to: (1) inspect the partnership books; (2) be informed of occurrences significantly relating to the partnership's business; (3) insist upon dissolution and winding up by court decree; and (4) receive income,
return of contribution, and other compensation from the partnership. See id. § 11 (Vernon
1970).
103. This would be the case if the entity were a general partnership. See id. art. 6132b,
8 9 (Vernon 1970).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

35

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 4, Art. 4

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:929

purposes of being able to approve or veto matters requiring approval of the limited partners. If the developer is allowed to transfer part of its interest to new limited partners, it may give the
lender the right to do the same. The theory underlying this decision is that the developer may be able to persuade new limited
partners holding interests assigned by both the lender and developer, thus constituting a majority in interest of the limited partners, to approve actions proposed by the general partner which the
10 4
lender itself has refused to approve.
7. Summary of Considerations.The use of a limited partnership to own the project in an equity participation arrangement
provides certain tax advantages that the use of a corporation does
not provide. Such advantages, however, are subject to considerable
risks, and can be achieved with other forms of ownership. In addition, the use of a limited partnership raises serious questions which
the lender must consider regarding limited liability and validity of
mortgage financing. If the lender does not wish to participate extensively in the management of the project and is going to provide
financing in the form of equity contributions or loans from third
party lenders, the use of a limited partnership may be satisfactory
to the lender. In most cases, however, the lender will want to consider the use of some other form of ownership arrangement in order to avoid the restrictions on its participation in the management of the project and to attempt to avoid the potential problems
of section 14 of the TULPA with respect to mortgage financing
which the lender may provide. The developer, on the other hand,
may wish to use a limited partnership in order to enhance its control over the project and to minimize the possibility that mortgage
financing provided by the lender will be classified as equity capital,
as discussed further below.

104. Approval necessary for an assignee to acquire the status of a substitute limited
partner can be obtained by setting out in the limited partnership certificate that the assignor has the right to constitute his assignee as a substitute limited partner. See id. art.
6132a, § 20 (Vernon 1970). As a substitute limited partner, the new limited partner may be
required to approve of, consent to, or ratify certain actions desired by the general partner.

The extent to which less than all of the limited partners could act in this regard presumably
would be set forth in the certificate, unless it is an act set forth in section 10, which would
require, in some instances, unanimity. Id. art. 6132a, §§ 8, 10 (Vernon 1970).
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C.

Use of a Co-Tenancy

1. Tax Considerations.A co-tenancy in a typical rental apartment project or office complex is likely to be treated as a general
partnership for tax purposes.1 0 5 Accordingly, a great deal of the
discussion in this article regarding the tax consequences of general
partnerships and joint ventures is equally applicable to a co-tenancy. The danger of using a co-tenancy is that its status as a partnership for tax purposes will not be recognized by the parties. As a
consequence, the parties may incur penalties for failing to file partnership tax returns and may neglect certain elections for tax purposes required to be made by the partnership rather than by its
individual partners.1 0 6
2. Liability Considerations.A co-tenancy may also be treated
as a general partnership for state law purposes.1 07 Therefore, much
of the discussion in this article concerning the liability consequences of general partnerships and joint ventures may be equally
applicable to a co-tenancy.1 08 It is possible for a court to conclude
that the parties' choice of a co-tenancy to own the project puts
third parties dealing with the co-tenants and the project on notice
that the joinder of both parties is required and that neither party
has the power, acting alone, to bind the other party. Nevertheless,
parties attempting to avoid the mutual agency relationship of a
general partnership by use of a co-tenancy would be well advised
to record in the local deed records the deeds for their undivided
interests in the property and a reference to their co-tenancy arrangement which disclaims the existence of a partnership. An assumed name certificate should also be filed for the project clearly

105. See I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2); Treas. Regs. § 1.761-1(a). See also Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 780 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
Although not enumerated within the list of entities designated as a partnership, a co-tenancy would readily fit within the Code's broad definition of a partnership. See id.; Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3. It appears that the co-tenancy envisioned here would not be able to
"elect out" of partnership status for tax purposes, at least after it had begun rental of the
project, since it would be engaged in a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 761(a)(1). See also 1
A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § i.05 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
106. See I.R.C. § 6698 (penalty for failure to file return). See also 1 W. McK , W.
NELSON

& R.

WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS

3.01 (1977).

107. The existence of a partnership presumably would be determined under the statu-

tory partnership provisions. See Tsx. REv. Civ.
(Vernon 1970).

STAT. ANN.

art. 6132b, § 6 & 7, comments

108. See text accompanying notes 123-26 infra.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

37

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 4, Art. 4

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:929

indicating that the property is owned by the parties as co-tenants
and not as partners. 0 9 Although these steps may not provide protection against trade creditors lacking actual or constructive notice
of the co-tenancy arrangement, it should provide some protection
against parties dealing with the project on matters of such magnitude as to impose a burden of inquiry regarding the title to the
property. 10
3. Control Considerations.The use of a co-tenancy for the project may solve certain questions of control while creating others. If
the title to the property is held by the parties as tenants in common, it will be difficult for either party to take any action with
third parties affecting the title to the entire project without the
joinder of the other party. On the other hand, if the lender and
developer have agreed that certain actions can be taken by one of
them without the joinder of the other, it may be possible for the
party whose joinder is not required to undermine the agreement
when a third party requires the non-joining party to join in the
action and it refuses to do so.
A more serious problem which the use of a co-tenancy may create involves the transfer of an interest in the co-tenancy. To avoid
this problem, some action must be taken to record any restrictions
on transfer or rights of first refusal which have been agreed upon
by the co-tenants. Failure to do so may enable either party to convey all or a portion of its undivided interest in the project without
the approval or joinder of the other party."' When a transferee
takes title from one of the parties without notice of any such restrictions or rights, the other party may be forced, without its consent, to deal with one or more additional co-tenants.
4. Effect on Mortgage Financing.When the parties structure
the ownership arrangement for the project as a co-tenancy and the
lender provides the mortgage financing, there may be some question concerning the consideration for the liens securing the financing as to the undivided ownership interest of the lender in the project.112 When foreclosure of the mortgage is necessary and the
109. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 36.10(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The

assumed
project.
110.
111.
112.

name certificate should set forth clearly the manner in which the parties hold the
See generally 15 TEX. JUR. 2d Co-tenancy §§ 31-32 (1960 & Supp. 1980).
See generally id. § 13.
Since the lender cannot be indebted to itself, it is not clear what consideration
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project is purchased by the lender, it appears that the potential
problems arising from a possible failure of consideration would not
be encountered. The lender obtains title to the entire project and
any future conveyance by the lender conveys full title. When the
project is purchased by a third party, however, there is a question
as to the extent of title obtained by the third party as a result of
the trustee's conveyance which evidenced the foreclosure purchase.
If the original grant of the mortgage was ineffective as to the
lender's undivided interest, it appears that the trustee could transfer only the developer's undivided interest. 13 Consequently, there
is a serious question as to the trustee's authority, if any, to conduct
a sale of the lender's undivided interest. An argument may be
made that the trustee was acting in the dual capacity as trustee
under deed of trust with respect to the developer's undivided interest and as agent with power of sale under an implied agency
with respect to the lender's undivided interest. The absence of
clear written authority for the trustee to act as the agent of the
lender, however, would be troublesome to a third-party purchaser
seeking to establish title to the entire project and not just to the
developer's interest.1 ' It seems unlikely, though, that a court
would deny the purchaser relief where it had paid a purchase price
at foreclosure based on acquiring the entire project and the lender
received the benefit of all or part of the amount paid by means of
application to its mortgage debt or with respect to its undivided
interest in the equity of the project." 5
These potential problems can be avoided if the lender and developer recognize them at the outset. One solution is for the lender to
there is for the mortgage liens to the extent they encumber an undivided interest in the
project which is owned by the lender at the time the liens are created. Cf. Home State Bank
v. Cavett, 518 S.W.2d 584, 587-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ) (deed of trust
invalid when grantor received no consideration).
113. Although a trustee under a deed of trust can convey title as a result of a foreclosure sale even if part of the debt is void, see State Mortgage Corp. v. Ludwig, 121 Tex. 268,
279, 48 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1932), the trustee cannot convey title exceeding that originally acquired under the deed of trust. See Groesbeeck v. Crow, 85 Tex. 200, 205, 20 S.W.
49, 51 (1892); Rosborough v. Picton, 34 S.W. 791, 793, motion for reh. overruled, 43 S.W.
1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
114. There presumably would be no question as to the validity of the mortgage with

respect to the developer's undivided ownership interest as there would have been adequate
consideration for the creation of the mortgage on the developer's interest.
115. See Jeffrey v. Bond, 509 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. 1974); Harris v. Masterson, 91 Tex.
171, 173, 41 S.W. 482, 483 (1897).
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use a subsidiary to hold the lender's undivided interest in the cotenancy. An alternative remedy is for the lender to provide mortgage financing structured simply as a loan to the developer of the
portion of the initially anticipated loan amount proportionate to
the developer's undivided ownership percentage, secured only by
the developer's undivided interest in the project. This technique
may present regulatory problems to lenders who are authorized to
make a loan for the entire amount required, but are not authorized
to make an equity investment in an amount equal to its undivided
ownership percentage of the initially anticipated loan amount.11 A
developer may also have some reservations about this technique,
because selling only its undivided interest in the project may adversely affect the price received at the foreclosure sale. Consequently, a developer may refuse to agree to this technique unless
the lender grants the trustee under the deed of trust a separate
irrevocable agency power to sell the lender's undivided interest in
the project simultaneously with the foreclosure sale of the developer's interest. A lender may not agree to such an arrangement
once the agency relationship has been clarified and refined in this
manner.
A court may conclude that the relationship between the lender
and developer created a separate partnership rather than a true
co-tenancy, resulting in a valid mortgage as to the lender's undivided interest. 117 As a result, the parties may agree that it is easier
to form a partnership at the outset and avoid the necessity of obtaining a court determination that what they really formed was a
partnership instead of the co-tenancy which they apparently
formed.
5. Effect on Title Insurance. The principal area in which the
use of a co-tenancy arrangement to own the project may benefit
the parties involves title insurance coverage for known but undis116. This technique may not be available to regulated lenders which are subject to limitations on their equity investments in such projects. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 545.9-1 (1980).
117. If the relationship between the developer and lender is deemed to constitute a
partnership, the lender would not have a real property interest in the project, but would
have a personal property interest in the partnership. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 26 (Vernon 1970). There would be no question of failure of consideration as to the
partnership, so the mortgage should be valid as to the entire interest in the project owned
by the partnership.
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closed title defects. If each of the parties obtains separate title insurance coverage for its respective undivided interest, it may be
argued that the knowledge of undisclosed title defects possessed by
one of the parties does not affect the title insurance coverage of the
other party. The title insurer may contend that the parties actually
created a partnership; therefore, the knowledge of one of the parties could be attributed to the other party."' 8 It is difficult to see
how the title insurer could be successful, however, when it was
willing at the outset to insure the parties' undivided interests separately and collect any extra premiums payable for two policies.11
In addition, the party without knowledge of the undisclosed title
defect may argue successfully that the creation of a partnership
subsequent to the acquisition of title to the property is. not inconsistent with the fact that they originally acquired separate undivided interests in the land which were insured separately. While
there may be some question as to the effect of later increases in
title insurance coverage to cover the value of the improvements
placed on the land, the primary concern of the parties is for losses
suffered due to title defects which existed when the land was
acquired.
6. Effect on Admitting Investors. Whether the parties have
created a true co-tenancy or a general partnership for state law
purposes, it seems that a co-tenancy arrangement results in
problems for both the lender and developer with respect to admitting additional investors. If the parties create a true co-tenancy,
additional investors acquiring undivided interests in the project
must join in any subsequent conveyance of the project. When the
parties inadvertently create a partnership, a conveyance of the project may still require joinder of all of the parties, since title to the
project would be held in undivided interests and, ordinarily, no
provision would have been made for a majority of the undivided
ownership interests to convey the entire project. In addition, there
will be great concern over the mutual agency powers which additional investors would have to bind the other inadvertent partners.
118. See id. § 12.
119. Under current title insurance regulations, somewhat larger premiums would be required with respect to the first $200,000 in insurance coverage if two policies are issued
instead of one. See Schedule of Basic Premium Rates for Title Insurance, Basic Manual-Title Insurance in the State of Texas, Section III, R-1. (Hart Graphics, Inc. 1981
Supp.).
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As noted previously, if the lender and developer structure their
ownership arrangement as a co-tenancy, they should record any
applicable restrictions on transfer or rights of first refusal in order
to control whether or not additional investors obtain an interest in
the project. Even if the co-tenancy were deemed to be a partnership for other purposes, where the parties structured record title to
the project as a co-tenancy, it may not be possible for them to successfully argue that the kinds of controls which general partners
can exercise over the admission of new partners should also apply
to the acquisition of undivided interests in the project.
7. Summary of Considerations.While the use of a co-tenancy
structure to own the project in an equity participation arrangement may offer some benefits in the area of title insurance, it appears to offer few, if any, other benefits. Such an arrangement may
combine significant disadvantages of a true general partnership
with comparable disadvantages of a true co-tenancy. Consequently,
it seems there are few situations in which a lender and developer
would be well-advised to utilize a co-tenancy structure for the ownership of the project in their equity participation arrangement.
D.

Use of a Joint Venture

The term "joint venture" is used herein simply to refer to a limited purpose general partnership. The only distinction being drawn
between a "joint venture" and an entity usually described as a
"general partnership" is that a joint venture is formed solely for
the purpose of owning and operating a single real estate project
and not to engage in the real estate business generally. 120
1. Tax Considerations.The use of a joint venture to own the
project results in the same basic tax consequences as a limited
partnership for the lender and developer." 1 The use of a general
partnership-type vehicle, however, avoids the pitfalls of the classi120. See Panama-Williams, Inc. v. Lipsey, 576 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments And The InstitutionalLender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39
FORDHAM L. REv. 579, 591 (1971).
121. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2). A joint venture is named as one of the entities within the
Code's definition of a "partnership." Id. See generally 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
§§ 4.05-.06 (1976). The author discusses the "partnership format for a joint venture" (using
the term "joint venture" generally as a description of an economic rather than a legal relationship) and concludes that it is a favored approach. See id.
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fication regulations under which a limited partnership might be
treated as an association taxable as a corporation rather than a
partnership for tax purposes."'
As is the case with a limited partnership, there are a number of
tax issues which the lender and developer must resolve in the
course of negotiating various aspects of the structure of the joint
venture, including the proper classification for tax purposes of
mortgage financing provided by the lender. Since these issues may
not be directly relevant to the choice of the type of entity to own
the project, they are discussed in the context of negotiating the
various terms of the equity participation arrangement itself.
2. Liability Considerations. One of the principal obstacles to
using a joint venture is the liabilities to which the lender and developer are thereby exposed. Although most of these adverse consequences can be eliminated by choosing a subsidiary corporation
to own the beneficial interest of each party, this technique is not
always satisfactory. In such situations, especially, the parties must
be aware of the extent to which the use of a joint venture to own
the project may give rise to unanticipated liabilities.
The general rule is that a joint venturer is jointly and severally
liable for all liabilities of the joint venture, in the same manner in
which members of a true general partnership would be liable. A
mutual agency relationship exists between the members of a joint
12 8
venture similar to that existing in a true general partnership.
The objective for using a joint venture, instead of a true general
partnership, is to achieve some limitation on the scope of the mutual agency relationship and, consequently, on the extent to which
one joint venturer effectively can bind the joint venture and the
other joint venturer to third-party liabilities without the consent of
the other joint venturer.
When a lender and developer form a joint venture, they typically
agree as to various limitations on the authority which each can exercise without the concurrence of the other. Notwithstanding such
122. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. See text accompanying notes 62-79 supra. It is assumed that there would not be any problem in the classification question if a joint venture
were used. See generally 1 A. WILLIs, PARTNERSHEP TAXATION §§ 1.01-.02, 4.04 (1976 &
Supp. 1981).
123. See Tex-Co Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ) (joint venturer's rights, duties, and liabilities are comparable to those of partners).
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agreed limitations, each venturer will continue to have some degree
of apparent authority to bind the joint venture and the other venturer to third parties who do not have actual or constructive notice
of the agreed limitations. The extent of this apparent authority depends upon the nature of the liabilities in question and whether
the third party acted reasonably in assuming that the joint venturer had authority to undertake such liabilities on behalf of the
joint venture and the other venturer.'
The use of a joint venture should serve to put third parties on
notice that neither of the venturers has authority to undertake liabilities for the joint venture or the other venturer with respect to
other real estate projects. Although there is not absolute purity in
this regard, it is generally believed that most members of the bar
and the business community draw a rather clear intellectual distinction between the concept of a joint venture formed for the purpose of a single real estate project and a true general partnership
formed to engage in the business of real estate. When there is confusion in this regard, it seems to prevail on the side of using the
term "general partnership" for a single-project endeavor rather
than on the side of using the term "joint venture" for a multi-project endeavor. Consequently, if one of the venturers seeks to undertake liabilities unrelated to the project, on behalf of the joint
venture and the other venturer, it is unlikely that a third party
would be able to enforce such liabilities against the joint venture
and the other venturer, unless it can be shown that the other venturer approved or ratified incurring such liabilities, either expressly
or by implication.

1 25

Determining the extent of the apparent authority of one of the
venturers to bind the joint venture and the other venturer to liabilities which are clearly related to the project may be a more difficult
task. There is a broad range of activities in which a typical joint
venture would be involved. While the determination of the extent
of apparent authority may be reasonably easy at each end of this
range, it is quite difficult in the middle area. For example, it is
fairly easy to determine that one of the venturers in a joint venture
124. See Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). See also 33 TEx. JUR. 2d, Joint Adventures § 9 (1962).
125. Cf. Southern Coast Corp. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 337 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1964)
(regarding estoppel of a venturer from asserting that it is not bound).
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which owns a garden apartment complex has apparent authority to
bind the joint venture and the other venturer to a six-month lease
on one of the apartment units in accordance with the standard
leasing terms and conditions for the complex. Similarly, it is easy
to determine that one of the venturers does not have apparent authority to bind the joint venture and the other venturer to a contract to sell the apartment complex.' In between these extremes,
however, are a number of activities where a venturer's apparent
authority may be more difficult to determine. For example, while
the lender and developer may view agreements pertaining to property management and operation of laundry room concessions to be
significant and determine that their mutual approval is required
for the execution of such agreements, this may not be obvious to
third parties. Consequently, one of the venturers may find itself
bound to perform an agreement of this type executed by the other
venturer without the first venturer's approval.
For the foregoing reasons, lenders and developers should be very
careful in choosing the parties with whom they are willing to form
a joint venture to own the project in an equity participation arrangement. Notwithstanding the exercise of great care in this regard, there continues to be some risk of exposure to unanticipated
liabilities. In the final analysis, however, such exposure may be
perceived as an acceptable risk to incur in or~1er to obtain other
advantages offered by having the project owned by a joint venture.
3. Control Considerations. As between themselves, the joint
venturers have virtually unlimited latitude regarding the extent to
which they can control the operations of the venture. 1 7 Since the
parties accept exposure to the project's liabilities when they agree
to utilize a joint venture, there is no reason to restrict either party
from participating in management, as there is with a limited partnership. The use of a joint venture also enables the parties to reach
whatever agreement is deemed appropriate regarding the terms
and conditions under which the project subsequently may be sold
126. As a conveyance of the project would not constitute carrying on the business of the
partnership in the usual way, such act would require authorization by all partners. See Tx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 9-10 (Vernon 1970).
127. See generally TIx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18 (Vernon 1980) (general

rules prescribed therein as to relationships between partners, including their equal rights in
the management and control of the partnership business, are subject to contrary provisions
in the partnership agreement).
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or refinanced by one of the parties without the further approval of
the other party. This avoids the potential question regarding the
enforceability of such an agreement which may exist with respect
to a limited partnership. 12 8 In addition, since the joint venture is
not subject to the corporate legal distinctions between actions appropriate for shareholders and actions appropriate for the board of
directors, the parties can draw the line wherever they choose between routine, daily activities which can be managed by one venturer and major decisions requiring concurrence of both venturers.
The parties may simply agree that all matters will require the concurrence of both venturers. As a practical matter, however, the
parties will usually distinguish between day-to-day activities falling within the province of one of the venturers and major decisions
requiring mutual concurrence, adopting appropriate guidelines
within which the designated venturer is authorized to exercise discretion as to the management of the daily activities.
4. Effect on Mortgage Financing.The use of a joint venture to
own the project avoids the question which may arise in the context
of a co-tenancy arrangement as to the status of the lender's undivided interest upon foreclosure of the mortgage securing the loan
by the lender to the co-tenancy. 129 A joint venture arrangement
may also solve some of the problems presented by section 14 of the
TULPA with respect to mortgage loans made to limited partnerships by limited partners.130 Section 40 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA) may, however, create other problems with respect to loans made by a lender venturer to its joint venture. 31
The TUPA does not prohibit a lender general partner from receiving collateral security in the property of a general partnership of
which it is a member or from receiving payments from an insolvent
general partnership. Section 40 of the TUPA provides, however,
that upon dissolution the assets of a general partnership available
for distribution are to be distributed first to creditors other than
partners.3 2 Since section 40 of the TUPA does not distinguish between secured and unsecured creditors, it seems that the claims of
128. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.

130. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 14(a)(1) (Vernon 1970). See text
accompanying notes 92-98 8upra.
131. See TEx. Riv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 40 (Vernon 1970).
132. See id. § 40(b)(I).
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a partner-creditor of a general partnership whose debt is secured
by a mortgage on partnership property would be subordinate to
the claims of both secured and unsecured nonpartner creditors. It
is difficult to determine, therefore, what protection the mortgage
on the project would afford to a lender joint venturer against thirdparty creditors of the joint venture.
Further analysis indicates that the priority status of the lender
joint venturer's loans to the joint venture should have little consequence in the selection of a joint venture to own the project. If the
assets of the joint venture are sufficient to satisfy both the third
parties' claims against the joint venture as well as the lender's
claims, the question of priority of payment is of minimal practical
importance. On the other hand, the assets of the joint venture may
be insufficient to satisfy all claims. The joint and several liability
of the lender joint venturer for unsatisfied third-party claims
would result, in that case, in the lender being liable for those
claims, subject to a right of contribution from the developer joint
venturer, thus negating any advantage which might otherwise be
derived from a priority position of the lender's mortgage.
5. Effect on Title Insurance. Compared with other forms of
ownership arrangements, a joint venture presents the most difficulties for the parties with respect to title insurance. Although knowledge of one of the joint ventures regarding undisclosed title defects
acquired prior to the formation of the joint venture might not be
attributed to the joint venture if the knowledgeable joint venturer
is not responsible for obtaining the title insurance, the importance
83
of the status of title to the property makes this result unlikely.
Accordingly, the knowledge of either joint venturer of undisclosed
title defects appears to be attributable to the joint venture, with
the title insurer being able to avoid liability under the title insur-

133. Under section 12 of article 6132b, it appears that the knowledge of the joint venturer responsible for obtaining the title insurance would be attributed to the joint venture
whether acquired before or after the joint venture is formed. That provision also would
attribute knowledge of the other joint venturer to the joint venture where the knowledge is
acquired after the joint venture is formed. It is not altogether clear whether knowledge acquired by the other joint venturer before the joint venture is formed will be attributed to
the joint venture. The language of the statute implies that such previously acquired knowledge should be attributed to the joint venture where the other joint venturer could have
communicated the knowledge to the joint venturer responsible for obtaining the title policy,
but the comment indicates that this is not the intended result of the statute. See id. art.
6132b, § 12 & comment.
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ance policy in the event of a failure of title because of the known
but undisclosed title defect.
6. Effect on Admitting Investors. Because of the mutual
agency relationship implicit in a joint venture, it is with this form
of ownership that the parties will be most concerned about procedures for admitting new investors. Since section 18(1)(g) of the
TUPA provides that no person can become a partner of a partnership without the consent of all the partners, 3 an agreement is not
necessary to prevent one of the venturers from being involuntarily
subject to claims arising from the actions of parties with whom the
venturer had not agreed to become a partner. The assignability of
a partner's interest,13 5 however, necessitates an advance agreement
as to the extent to which such assignments are to be subject to
prohibitions or restrictions, such as rights of first refusal.
7. Summary of Considerations. Comparatively, the use of a
joint venture as the project ownership vehicle may be the most satisfactory form for both the lender and developer in most situations. A joint venture will provide the same tax benefits as a limited partnership without incurring the risks of inadvertent
classification as an association taxable as a corporation. A joint
venture will also permit each of the parties to participate fully in
the management of the project. The lender, however, will be subject to liabilities to a greater extent than it would be as a limited
partner, and its mortgage financing will be less secure than it
would be if the project entity were a limited partnership. Moreover, as discussed further below, the developer may prefer to use a
limited partnership to avoid reclassification of the mortgage
financing as equity capital, even if the developer is willing to allow
the lender to participate fully in the management of the project.
These concerns which the use of a joint venture raises for the parties may be curable, however, if the lender is able to use a subsidiary to own its interest in the joint venture. In that event, it seems
that, although it is not perfect, a joint venture is likely to be the
best possible form for achieving the objectives of the parties in a
typical equity participation arrangement.

134. See id. § 18(1)(g).
135. See id. § 27.
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EQUITY PARTICIPATION
CHOICE OF OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT IN PROJECT ENTITY

In addition to deciding what type of entity or structure will be
used to own the project, the lender and developer must decide
what type of arrangement each of them will use to own its respective beneficial ownership interest in the entity or structure owning
the project. Although the considerations involved in these two
levels of decision-making have been somewhat arbitrarily separated for purposes of discussion, the two decisions are usually
made concurrently and the decision made with respect to one issue
will affect, and be affected by, the decision made as to the other
issue.
A.

Choice of Ownership Arrangements by Lenders.

1. Tax Considerations.If a lender is not prohibited by law or
applicable regulatory restrictions from owning its interest in the
project entity through a wholly-owned subsidiary rather than directly, such procedure may provide significant benefits for the
lender. Obviously, care should be taken to assure that the lender is
legally permitted to utilize a subsidiary for this purpose.
A lender using a wholly-owned subsidiary to obtain some of the
potential advantages discussed in succeeding portions of this section should not encounter any tax problems if the lender is eligible
to file a consolidated corporate income tax return for itself and the
subsidiary. 86 Assuming that the project entity is a joint venture,
the tax benefits of the ownership of the project would "flow
through" the joint venture's tax returns to the wholly-owned subsidiary, and the subsidiary's share Of the tax benefits would flow
through to the lender-parent by means of the consolidated income
tax return filed by the subsidiary and the lender-parent. 13 7 In this
manner, net operating losses realized by the subsidiary from the
joint venture may be applied to offset taxable income derived by
the lender from its separate activities. 3 8 Ordinary taxable income
realized by the subsidiary from the joint venture is taxed only once
as part of the consolidated taxable income of the lender-parent
136. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11 (1980). The "flow through" effect is a generalization; the
validity of which depends upon a number of factors which are beyond the scope of this
article.
138. Id. § 1.1502-21.
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and the subsidiary.-' 9 Moreover, operating losses realized by the
lender-parent from its separate activities may offset ordinary taxable income realized by the subsidiary from the joint venture during
the later years of the project's existence. " This reciprocal offsetting procedure and single-tax treatment is also available for capital
gains and losses realized by the lender-parent and the subsidiary."' Finally, cash flow distributions and proceeds of capital
transactions received by the subsidiary from the joint venture 4 are
2
passed through to the lender-parent without double taxation.1
If the lender-parent is not eligible to file a consolidated corporate income tax return with the proposed subsidiary, the use of a
subsidiary could have materially adverse tax consequences. The
lender-parent would not be able to offset losses realized by the
subsidiary from the project entity against income from the lender's
separate activities. Conversely, the lender-parent would not be able
to offset losses from its separate activities against taxable income
realized by the subsidiary during the later years of the project's
existence. To the extent the subsidiary has taxable income, there
would be double taxation on 15% of dividend distributions to the
lender-parent. 4 1 Moreover, tax-free cash flow distributions received by the subsidiary from the project entity which are passed
through to the lender-parent at a time when the subsidiary has no
earnings and profits would be taxable to the lender-parent to the
extent the distributions exceed the lender-parent's basis in the
subsidiary's stock.144 In the event of the sale of the project, if the
subsidiary has not been liquidated previously, any capital gain realized with respect to the subsidiary's interest in the project entity
would be subject to tax at the subsidiary level and could not be
offset by capital losses realized by the lender-parent from its separate activities. 4 5 Unless the subsidiary is then liquidated, there
would also be tax on at least 15% of the amounts distributed by
139. Id. §§ 1.1502-11, .1502-12.
140. Id. § 1.1502-21.
141. Id. §§ 1.1502-11, .1502-22.
142. Id. §§ 1.1502-11, .1502-14.
143. I.R.C. § 243 (only 85% of the dividends received are eligible for the deduction); id.
§ 11 (the amount remaining after taking into account the 85% dividends received deduction, or 15%, would be subject to taxation at both the lender-parent and subsidiary levels).
144. I.R.C..§ 301(c)(3).
145. In the situation discussed, there would be no consolidation of income or losses of
the lender-parent and subsidiary.
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the subsidiary to the lender-parent as a result of the sale of the
project. 1"
2. Liability Considerations.One of the principal reasons why a
lender may prefer to use a subsidiary to own its beneficial interest
in the project entity is the degree to which this technique would
insulate the lender's separate assets and activities from liabilities
arising out of the operations of the project and the project entity.
This limitation of liability is not ordinarily acceptable to the developer with respect to liabilities of the lender to the developer; thus,
the lender is usually required to guarantee the performance of the
subsidiary's obligations to the developer. Such guarantee would
not ordinarily extend, however, to unauthorized obligations to
third parties. 4 7 The lender's limitation of liability is also eroded to

the extent that it uses the same subsidiary to engage in a number
of equity participation arrangements. Beyond the assets of the
subsidiary and the limited scope of the lender's guaranty of performance to the developer, however, the use of a properly organized and maintained subsidiary to own the lender's beneficial interest should insulate the lender's separate assets and activities
from liabilities arising out of the operations of the project and the
project entity.
3. Effect on Mortgage Financing.The lender may want to consider the use of a subsidiary to attempt to resolve some of the
lender's potential problems under the TULPA and the TUPA with
respect to mortgage financing which it provides for the project. Assuming that the legal requirements for obtaining recognition of the
subsidiary as a separate corporation have been satisfied, the lender
may be able to avoid the problems regarding loans by partners if it
utilizes the subsidiary to be the partner in the project entity and
provides the mortgage financing to the project entity directly. 1"
146. See note 143 supra. In the event the subsidiary is liquidated, the lender-parent
presumably would not recognize gain or loss by reason of I.R.C. section 332.
147. A lender which would otherwise be reluctant to utilize a joint venture as the project entity may be willing to do so if the lender's subsidiary owned the joint venture interest.
Presumably, the developer would require a guarantee from the lender for the obligations of
the subsidiary. Likewise, it would appear that the parties would desire to cross-indemnify
each other for, among other things, liabilities incurred outside the scope of their authority
or in violation of the joint venture agreement.
148. The assumption is made that there will not be, for state law purposes, any question regarding the separate existence of the lender-parent and its subsidary. See generally
Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments And The InstitutionalLender:
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There does not appear to be any basis within the TULPA and
the TUPA to negate the legal distinction between the lender and
its subsidiary in an arrangement such as this, resulting in treatment of them as a single entity for purposes of imposing the restrictions of the TULPA and the TUPA regarding loans by partners with respect to the mortgage financing provided by the lender
to the project entity. Since the subsidiary, and not the lender, is
the named member of the project entity, it is improbable that a
third party could successfully contend that it had been misled into
believing that the mortgage financing provided by the lender constituted a loan to the project entity by a partner.1' On the other
hand, since the lender does not have the status of a partner for any
other purpose, it is difficult to determine how either the TULPA or
the TUPA could be interpreted to make the lender a partner solely
for the purpose of imposing these restrictions.
4. Summary of Considerations.Certain lenders are prohibited
by law from utilizing a subsidiary to own their beneficial interest in
project entities. Other lenders are ineligible to file consolidated
corporate income tax returns with their subsidiaries and may be
unwilling or unable to absorb or avoid the unfavorable tax consequences of being required to file separate tax returns. A lender
which does not face these problems, however, should consider the
use of a subsidiary to own its beneficial interest in the project entity in order to achieve the advantages of limitation of liability and
avoid the problems created when mortgage financing provided by
the lender is treated as a loan by a partner.
B.

Choice of Ownership Arrangements by Developers

The typical developer is usually less interested in the advantages
which might be obtained by utilizing a separate entity to own its
interest in the project than it is in determining whether its principal officers and shareholders can participate individually in the economic and tax benefits which may result from their owning an
interest in the project entity. This objective often leads a developer
to consider the possible advantages and disadvantages of creating a
partnership between itself and its principals to own the interest
Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 618-20 (1971).

149. See Associates Dev. Corp. v. Air Control Prods., Inc., 392 S.W.2d 542, 544-45 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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which the developer would otherwise own in the project entity.8 0
Discussed below are some of the considerations which should be
taken into account by a developer in determining whether to own
its interest in the project entity directly, through a corporate subsidiary, or through a developer-partnership with its principals.
Since the issues involved in the concept of utilizing a developerpartnership in a real estate transaction are not limited to equity
participation arrangements with institutional lenders, a complete
discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article. 15 The
following, therefore, is an attempt to call attention to some of the
major issues which should be resolved in connection with developer-partnerships.
1. Tax Considerations.It should not be particularly significant
to the developer whether it owns its interest in the project entity
directly or through a wholly-owned subsidiary. Assuming that the
developer and its subsidiary are able to file a consolidated corporate income tax return, the tax results are substantially the same
for the developer in both instances. For this reason, if other advantages can be obtained by using a subsidiary to own the interest in
the project entity, tax consequences should not be prohibitive.
When a developer and its principals are considering the formation of a developer-partnership to own the interest which the developer would otherwise own in the project entity, the primary tax
concern is the extent to which the principals may be deemed to
have realized taxable income as a result of the developer's activities in connection with the project. For example, assume that the
developer and its principals form a limited partnership to own the
interest which would otherwise be owned by the developer in the
project entity, that the developer is the sole general partner and
the principals are the limited partners, and that the developer
owns 50% of the limited partnership and the principals own the
150. The term "developer-partnership" is used in the text to refer to the relationship
created between the developer and its principals. The developer-partnership is assumed to
be a general or limited partnership.
151. The developer and its principals must consider a number of issues in the process
of making any decision in this regard. For example, a critical issue that must be addressed
and resolved involves the implications of the "corporate opportunity" doctrine if the principals do not constitute all of the shareholders of the developer. The parties also must determine, among other things, the extent to which the principals will be liable for the obligations of the developer-partnership and the impact any limitations thereon may have on the
tax effects of the relationship.
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other 50 %. If the developer-partnership is obligated to the lender
to provide funds to the project entity to the extent necessary to
defray construction cost overruns and operating deficits, and the
principals are not required to contribute their proportionate share
of such funds to the developer-partnership, the argument could be
made that the principals have realized taxable income as a result
of the performance by the developer of the developer-partnership's
obligations. 15 The amount of taxable income realized by the principals might be limited to the 50% of the funds required which the
developer provided ifi their stead, or it might consist of the value
of the principals' interest in the developer-partnership at the time
the developer performs such obligations. The income so realized by
the principals might be characterized as compensation subject to
the maximum tax on earned income or, when the principals are
shareholders of the developer, it might be characterized as dividends subject to the maximum tax on unearned income. 168 In any
event, it is likely that the Service would take the position that the
principals had realized taxable income in some amount and character as a result of the developer's performance of the developerpartnership's obligations. This result is even more likely where the
developer-partnership is formed after the project is completed and
the developer has performed substantially all of its obligations to
the lender. ' "
Several guidelines should be followed by the developer and its
152. The risk in this situation is that the Service would claim that the corporate funds
of the developer had been diverted to the personal use of the principals, because the developer provided funds needed by the developer-partnership to satisfy its obligations with respect to, and preserve its interest in, the project. To the extent the developer provides such
funds in excess of its proportionate ownership interest in the developer-partnership, the
argument could be made that the developer has satisfied liabilities of the principals, see
Wortham Mach. Co. v. United States, 521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975); or that the developer
has diverted corporate funds for the personal benefit of the principals. See Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1976) (rev'g 61 T.C. 624 (1974)). See generally B. BIrrKER
& J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS $ 7.05 (1979
& Supp. 1980).
153. See I.R.C. § 1348. Earned income does not include amounts received which represent a distribution of earnings and profits from a corporation rather than a reasonable
allowance as compensation for personal service actually rendered. Id. § 911(b).
154. See generally 1 W. McKRE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS

5.02, .05-.06 (1977 & Supp. 1980). It is unclear what the

amount of income would be, particularly when the interest received is an interest in profits
only or in capital and profits. Id,
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principals in organizing and operating a developer-partnership in
order to minimize such tax problems. The developer-partnership
should be formed at, or prior to, the formation of the project entity
and the commencement of construction of the project. Preferably,
the developer-partnership should be the entity which initially contracts to purchase the land on which the project is built. The developer-partnership should be organized in a manner which will
enable it to participate in several projects. 155 Such organization
would give economic substance to the ability of the developer-partnership and its individual partners regarding performance of its
(and their) obligations with respect to the project and under the
contract to purchase the land for the project. Finally, the obligations of the developer and its principals to provide funds required
by the developer-partnership to fulfill its obligations to the project
entity should be proportionate to their respective interests in the
developer-partnership.
Assuming that the problems described above can be surmounted, the use of a developer-partnership to own what would
otherwise be the developer's interest in the project entity can be of
significant benefit to the developer's principals. During the early
years of the project's existence, the developer's principals would be
able to offset their share of the tax losses generated by the project
against their other income and would benefit from the receipt of
their share of the tax-sheltered cash flow from the project without
incurring the tax on dividends or compensation which would be
payable if the cash flow distributions were initially received by the
developer and then paid to the principals.'" 6 During the later years
of the project's existence, taxable income generated by the project
would not be subject to double taxation at both the developer and
principal level."57 Further, in the event of the sale of the project,
the principals' share of the profits realized as a result of the sale
could be received directly by the principals without double taxation. 58 In many cases, the profits received by the principals would
be treated as long-term capital gains subject to more favorable tax
155. Preferably, the developer-partnership also would have substantial capital and

would not attempt to limit the liability of the principals.
156. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
157. See I.R.C. § 702. See text accompanying notes 26-40 supra, for a discussion of
some of the tax consequences of holding the interest in the corporate form.
158. See I.R.C. § 702.
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rates than would be applicable if the profits were received as additional compensation to the developer's principals in an effort to
avoid double taxation at both the developer and principal level. 1 "9
Obviously, these potential tax advantages of a developer-partnership are substantial and justify consideration of the use of a developer-partnership in most situations.
2. Liability Considerations.The principal reason why a developer should consider owning its interest in the project entity
through a subsidiary is to achieve some degree of limitation of liability with respect to obligations arising out of the operations of
the project entity. Although the lender will probably require that
the developer guarantee the performance of the subsidiary's obligations to the lender, including contribution obligations, the use of
a subsidiary insulates the developer from claims based on unauthorized obligations to third parties. It should be noted, however, that
the lender customarily looks to the developer to be responsible for
the daily management of the project entity and, for this reason,
may be unwilling to give the developer the opportunity to limit its
liability in this manner by using a subsidiary.
Potential liability is of great concern to the principals of the developer in connection with the question of whether to form a developer-partnership to own the interest which the developer would
otherwise own in the project entity. As previously noted, however,
serious tax consequences can result if the liabilities of the principals with respect to the developer-partnership are more limited
than those of the developer. Thus, while it may not be necessary
that the principals have unlimited liability with respect to obligations of the developer-partnership to the lender, any limitations on
such liability should also apply to the developer.
There are a number of third-party liability areas where it is impossible to achieve effective limitation of the principals' liabilities
if a developer-partnership is utilized to own the interest in the project entity. Although insurance can be obtained which affords some
degree of protection, there is always the possibility that the princi159. See id. § 1202 (providing for a 60% deduction for capital gains); id. § 1348 (providing for a 50% maximum tax on personal service income). Even if the principal's marginal
rate were the maximum of 70%, the effective rate on a capital gain would be 28%. Also, it

would not be necessary to adopt a plan of complete or partial liquidation of the developer or
incur the risk of paying unreasonable compensation to the developer's principals to avoid
double taxation.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss4/4

56

Barton and Morrison: Equity Participation Arrangements between Institutional Lenders a

1981]

EQUITY PARTICIPATION

pals will incur some liability for third-party contract and tort
claims. This potential liability extends to mortgage financing provided by the lender joining in the equity participation arrangement
to the extent that such financing is not secured solely by the project. The possibility of incurring such liabilities should be weighed
carefully by the principals when considering the economic and tax
benefits which they might obtain individually through utilization
of the developer-partnership.
In order to limit their liability and avoid the possible inadvertent receipt of taxable income, some principals may prefer to
structure the developer-partnership in a manner which requires
that the developer alone assume certain risks for which it is duly
compensated. For example, in many equity participation arrangements, the developer and its principals expect profits to be generated not only as a result of their ownership interest in the project
but also in connection with the development of the project. For
instance, the lender may be willing to allow the developer to make
a profit on the development of the project reflecting the anticipated value which the lender will own in the equity of the project
upon completion. Since the appraised value of the completed project is often significantly greater than the cost of development and
construction of the project, the potential development profit may
be substantial. When development profits are paid to the principals through the developer-partnership, there may be reason for
concern that the principals will not retain their share of the funds
for purposes of recontribution to the developer-partnership if required to cover future liabilities. Some principals may be willing,
therefore, to forego their share of the development profits and
agree that the entire amount be paid to the developer. In exchange
for this agreement, the developer would provide the first funds required by the developer-partnership to fulfill its obligations with
respect to cost overruns and operating deficits of the project up to
the amount of the development profits initially received by the developer. The principals would be obligated to contribute additional
funds only after the developer has recontributed to the developerpartnership either the entire amount of the development profits or
the portion which the principals would otherwise have received
through the developer-partnership. Conversely, if the amount required by the developer-partnership to fulfill its obligations with
respect to the project is less than the development profits initially
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received by the developer, the excess development profits would
belong entirely to the developer.
It is not entirely clear that this technique of limiting the liability
of the developer's principals avoids the possible tax problems discussed in the preceding section. It is probably ineffective when it is
ascertainable at the outset that the potential amounts required by
the developer-partnership to defray future liabilities regarding the
project will equal or exceed the development profits, so that it is
unlikely that the developer will be able to retain any portion of the
development profits. When it appears reasonably certain, however,
that the developer will be able to retain a significant portion of the
development profits in excess of the share it otherwise would have
received through the developer-partnership, this technique not
only provides some degree of protection from liability for the developer's principals but may also avoid potential tax problems.160
Although not directly related to a particular equity participation
arrangement, there is another liability consideration which should
be taken into account by the developer and its principals in deciding whether to use a developer-partnership. To the extent that the
profits generated by the project are passed through to the principals by means of using a developer-partnership, such profits are
not available to the developer for further investment or debt reduction, and are not reflected in its financial statements. Consequently, the financial strength of the developer is not improved.
This factor may postpone the time when the developer will have
achieved sufficient financial strength that lenders and other third
parties are willing to extend financing to, and otherwise contract
with, the developer without the assurance of the principals' personal guarantees of the developer's performance of its obligations.
For this reason, the developer's principals will often conclude that
it is prudent to have the developer retain a substantial interest in
the developer-partnership, so that the developer will have an opportunity to receive and utilize a substantial portion of the profits
of the project to improve its financial strength, notwithstanding
160. The problems discussed in the text accompanying notes 152-55 supra, may arise
because the developer did not receive any benefit from the payments it agreed to make on
behalf of the principals. If the developer receives a benefit for such undertaking, however,
the fact that such payments were made may not result in income to the principals. See
Sammons v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1972) (no constructive dividend unless primarily for shareholder purposes rather than corporate purposes).
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other considerations that might lead to the conclusion that the
principals should have a more substantial interest in the developer-partnership.
Finally, the developer itself may be concerned about the extent
to which the use of a developer-partnership may expose the developer to unanticipated liabilities. Assuming that a general partnership is used in order to avoid potential tax problems for the principals, a mutual agency relationship will exist between the developer
and each of the principals participating in the developer-partnership. Although the principals are customarily officers of the developer who possess actual or apparent authority to bind the developer to liabilities, there may be some instances in which the
developer would have even greater exposure to unanticipated liabilities as a result of the mutual agency and apparent authority of
a principal who is a partner in a developer-partnership.I' 1
3. Control Considerations.There is some diffusion of control
over the interest which the developer would otherwise own in the
project entity where the developer forms a developer-partnership
to own that interest. An individual principal of the developer has
separate rights as a partner of the developer-partnership from
those the same individual principal would have as an officer of the
developer. An individual principal of the developer is also subject,
theoretically, to less control as a partner of the developer-partnership than the same individual would be as an officer of the developer. These distinctions ordinarily are not of significant practical
concern, since an individual principal of the developer usually
desires to cooperate with the developer in order to protect the individual's employment status with the developer. For these reasons, however, the developer should have the right to repurchase
the individual principal's interest in the developer-partnership in
the event the individual's employment with the developer is terminated. Such an arrangement does not appear to be particularly
troublesome, but care should be taken that the individual principal's interest is purchased at a fair value. Otherwise, the position
could be taken that the benefits received by the individual from
the developer-partnership during the period the individual was
161. For example, a partner's authority to bind the partnership goes beyond the authority of an officer of a corporation to bind the corporation. Compare Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b, § 9 (Vernon 1970) with Tzx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 2.42 (Vernon 1980).
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employed by the developer did not result from a true ownership
interest in the developer-partnership, but represented compensation or dividends paid indirectly by the developer to the individual
principal.

62

4. Summary of Considerations.The developer is usually satisfied to own its interest in the project entity directly. If a developer
wants to have such interest owned by an intervening subsidiary
corporation, and the lender is willing for the developer to do so,
that procedure should not present materially adverse tax consequences for the developer and does provide some limitation of liability. It is also possible for the developer to utilize a developerpartnership comprised of the developer and certain of its principals. The use of a developer-partnership, however, should be scrutinized carefully because it does present some potential tax, liability, and control concerns for the developer and its principals.
V.

ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL EQUITY PARTICIPATION ARRANGEMENTS

The final major structural decision which the lender and developer must make in formulating their proposed equity participation
arrangement is the selection of the type of equity participation arrangement they will utilize. The choice between an initial ownership, a convertible mortgage, and a purchase option arrangement is
made concurrently with the choice of the form of project entity
and the methods by which the lender and developer will own their
respective interests in the project entity. The lender and developer
should take into account certain general considerations in choosing
among these three basic types of equity participation arrangements. Following a preliminary discussion of these issues, a number of the considerations which the parties should take into
account in negotiating various terms of their proposed equity participation arrangement are addressed. Certain terms of the agreement are not discussed in detail, as they have been covered in the
foregoing text.
162. If the principal is not allowed to benefit from increases in the value of his interest
in the developer-partnership, or to suffer from decreases in such value, it is difficult to conclude that there is a true ownership status with respect to the principal's interest in the
developer-partnership. In that event, the developer-partnership could be construed as
merely a conduit for the payment of dividends or additional compensation to the principal.
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General Considerations

Each of the three basic types of equity participation arrangements ultimately will result in a joint ownership arrangement between the lender and developer. Accordingly, the choice between
an initial ownership arrangement and either a convertible mortgage or a purchase option arrangement is actually a matter of the
timing as to when the lender becomes a joint owner of the project.
Nevertheless, this choice is of significant importance to both the
lender and developer.
1. Tax Considerations.Tax considerations play a major role in
determining the most appropriate type of equity participation arrangement. If the lender wishes to participate in the tax benefits
generated by the project during the early years of its existence, it
will be necessary to utilize an initial ownership arrangement.
Conversely, if the parties have agreed that the developer is to enjoy all of the tax benefits generated by the project during the early
years, they may prefer to use a purchase option arrangement to
assure such a result. By using the purchase option arrangement,
the parties may be able to circumvent the difficult problems involved in creating a workable special allocation formula within an
initial ownership arrangement and avoid a characterization of the
lender's putative debt as an equity contribution within either an
initial ownership arrangement or a convertible mortgage arrangement.
Lenders are willing, in many instances, to allow the developer to
take advantage of the tax benefits which are generated by the
project during the early years of its existence, because the lender
has a low effective tax rate or does not wish to report losses on its
financial statements. In many situations, therefore, tax considerations will influence the parties to use a purchase option
arrangement.
2. Liability Considerations.Unanticipated liabilities cause the
parties most concern during the early years of the project's existence. This is the period when construction cost overruns can occur
and operating deficits are most often experienced as efforts are
made to achieve stabilized rentals for the project. It is also the
time when the value of the project is at its lowest ration in com-
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parison to its potential liabilities."" Consequently, a lender may
prefer to provide only mortgage financing for the project at the
outset, within the context of either a convertible mortgage or a
purchase option arrangement. A developer, however, often resists
this effort on the part of the lender, in order to reduce the developer's exposure to the risk of construction cost overruns and operating deficits during this period.
A compromise which may be reached is for the lender to provide
a generous amount of mortgage financing for the project, attempting to protect the developer against potential risks. This technique
is limited for many lenders, though, as the amount of mortgage
financing provided by a regulated lender is typically restricted to a
specified percentage of the appraised value of the project.'" Moreover, the developer is unlikely to be satisfied entirely with this
technique, since the debt service on the mortgage financing provided by the lender is a mandatory charge against the revenues of
the project, while the return on equity financing is usually a charge
against the net cash flow of the project, payable only to the extent
available.
The resolution which the parties should reach is difficult to predict. In some situations, the lender is willing to incur the potential
liabilities of participating in an initial ownership arrangement in
order to obtain tax or other advantages. In other situations, particularly where several lenders are competing to participate in a particular project, the developer may be able to persuade at least one
lender that the potential liabilities of an initial ownership arrangement are minimal.
3. Control Considerations. An initial ownership arrangement
achieves maximum control for the lender over the construction and
operation of the proposed project. Although mortgage financing instruments traditionally have allowed lenders to exercise substantial
control over certain matters, such instruments leave a number of
items to the discretion of the developer. Developers can be expected to resist attempts by lenders to achieve the control of a
joint owner without incurring commensurate risks. In addition, a
lender exercising the control of a joint owner from the beginning of
163. Because of this, the project does not serve as any meaningful "buffer" between
third parties and the separate assets of the developer and lender.

164. See Tex. Say. & Loan Comm'n Rule 08.00.003.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss4/4

62

Barton and Morrison: Equity Participation Arrangements between Institutional Lenders a

1981]

EQUITY PARTICIPATION

an equity participation arrangement structured as a convertible
mortgage or purchase option arrangement may be held liable as a
joint owner. 1 5 Consequently, if the lender wishes to extend its control over the project beyond that conferred by traditional mortgage
financing instruments, it is likely that the parties will structure the
proposed transaction as an initial ownership arrangement.
4. Effect on Mortgage Financing.A lender may wish to structure the proposed equity participation arrangement as a convertible mortgage or purchase option arrangement in order to avoid or
limit some of the problems with regard to loans by partners under
the TULPA and the TUPA. If the lender provides mortgage
financing for the project when it has no ownership interest, it could
be argued that the restrictions of the TULPA and the TUPA regarding loans by partners would not be applicable, even if the
lender subsequently acquired an ownership interest in the project."" This argument might be particularly persuasive with respect to section 14 of the TULPA, which prohibits the granting of
collateral security to a limited partner, because that provision appears to focus on the status of the lender at the time the loan is
167
made.
The provisions of the TULPA and the TUPA which restrict loan
payments to partners create more concern since those provisions
may be construed to refer to the status of the lender at the time
payment is made on the loan, rather than the status of the lender
165. Cf. Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7 (Vernon 1970) (regarding rules for
determining existence of a partnershp); id. § 16 (regarding partnership by estoppel). For a
discussion of the consequences of such a finding, see text accompanying notes 80-91 (regarding limited partnerships), notes 207-10 (regarding co-tenancies), and notes 123-26 (regarding
joint ventures) supra.
166. Since the lender would not be in the status of a partner at the time the loans were
made, the statutory provision arguably would not apply under their terms. With respect to
the problems caused by the TULPA, the provisions of section 14 should not apply for the
reason stated. Also, section 24(a)(1) would not appear adversely to affect that argument.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, §§ 14, 24 (Vernon 1977). With respect to the TUPA,
however, the same considerations apply as are noted in the text accompanying note 132
supra.
167. The argument would appear to be even stronger if section 14 of the TULPA is
held to prohibit the granting of collateral security to a limited partner only if the limited
partnership is insolvent at the time it is granted. In that event, the lender might want to
provide only mortgage financing at the outset when the greatest danger exists that the limited partnership would be held to be insolvent, and to acquire a lirpited partnership interest
only after the project is completed and operating, and it is clear that the partnership is
solvent.
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at the time the loan is made.1 8 This result is most likely in the
context of a joint venture subject to the TUPA, since the TUPA
makes loans by partners subordinate to other creditors. 6 9 Under
the TULPA, secured loans by a limited partner are on at least a
parity with general creditors. 170 The somewhat different policy implications of this fact may justify a conclusion that the restrictions
of section 14 of the TULPA do not prohibit payments by a limited
partnership on a loan made by a lender prior to becoming a limited
partner, notwithstanding the subsequent insolvency of the limited
partnership and admission of the lender as a limited partner. Since
the lender was not a limited partner when the loan was made, and
its right to become a limited partner was not necessarily public
knowledge, other creditors should not have been misled as to the
status of the loan. Even if the lender's right to become a limited
partner was a matter of public record or public knowledge, there
was no assurance that the lender would exercise this right. The
same reasoning could justify a conclusion that a loan made by a
lender before it became a limited partner should not merit the
same treatment as a loan made by a lender limited partner, and
should, therefore, be accorded priority over, and not parity with,
the claims of general creditors of the partnership. The success of
this argument in the context of a project entity organized as a limited partnership results in a significant benefit to a lender which is
able to sustain its position as a limited partner, since the lender
would not be liable for the claims of unsatisfied creditors.
As a result, a lender may wish to structure the proposed equity
participation arrangement as a purchase option or convertible
mortgage arrangement. Although it is not certain that such an arrangement would preserve the priority of the lender's mortgage on
the project and avoid the prohibitions of section 14 of the TULPA,
a persuasive case can be made that this result is appropriate.
5. Summary of Considerations.In some respects, a lender is in
a more favorable position when a proposed equity participation arrangement is structured as a convertible mortgage or purchase op168. Trax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 24(a)(1) & art. 6132b, § 40 (Vernon 1970).
169. Id. art. 6132b, § 40. Again, however, this should have little or no practical effect
because of the joint and several liability of the lender as a member of the joint venture. See
text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
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tion arrangement. In certain instances, however, the lender may
desire to structure the transaction as an initial ownership arrangement, or be willing to do so at the insistence of the developer.
B.

Analysis of Initial Ownership Arrangement.

In an initial ownership arrangement, the lender and developer
own an interest in the project and the project entity from the outset. Many of the issues they need to resolve in structuring their
agreement will be affected by this fact. Some of the issues which
type of equity participation
should be resolved in fashioning this
17 1
arrangement are discussed below.
1. Determining Ownership Percentages and Debt/Equity
Ratio. Determination of the relative ownership percentages of the
lender and developer in their proposed initial ownership arrangement and the relative amounts of construction financing and equity financing to be provided for the project are matters of business
negotiation which the parties usually resolve before seeking the assistance of their respective counsel. These determinative factors
are largely beyond the scope of this article. Although the parties
may have considered some of the other issues discussed below,
prior agreement on such issues is not common and the assistance
of counsel is usually needed in reaching a complete agreement.
2. Capital Contribution Responsibilities. While the amount of
equity financing initially provided by the lender for its ownership
interest in the project may be determined, the timing of such contribution and the responsibilities for providing additional equity
financing are often unsettled. In some cases, the lender may provide all of its initial capital contribution upon commencement of
construction in order to: (1) reduce interest costs on the construction loan for the project; (2) meet the security requirements of the
construction lender; (3) cover costs which cannot be covered by the
construction loan; or (4) allow the developer the use of the funds
during the construction period. In other instances, the lender may
be unwilling to provide its capital contribution until the project is
171. For additional considerations, see Nellis, Christy & Browne, Selective Checklist
for Negotiating and Drafting a Real Estate Joint Venture Agreement, in REALTY JoINT
VENTURES: PENSION FUNDS-INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-DEVELOPERS 73 (Practicing Law Institute 1980); Roulac, Structuringthe Joint Venture, MERGERS & ACQUISITION, Spring 1980,
at 4-14.
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completed or a certain occupancy level has been achieved. Although these decisions are a matter of business negotiation between the developer, the lender, and the construction lender, there
are certain tax consequences which should be 'kept in mind by the
parties in negotiating an agreement on these issues.
When the lender does not participate in tax losses generated by
the project during the construction period, the timing of payment
of the lender's capital contributions will not be important to the
lender. On the other hand, if the lender participates in such losses,
the timing of payment of the lender's capital contributions can be
of great significance.
In order to obtain current deductions for losses generated by the
project during the construction period, the lender must have a basis in its interest in the project entity during this period.17 The
lender can obtain a basis by contributing capital to the project entity during the construction period. 17 8 When the lender and developer have joint and several liability for the payment of the construction loan, the lender's basis is equal to a percentage of the
construction loan which is the same as the lender's percentage of
sharing losses of the project entity. 174 If neither the developer nor
lender assume liability for the construction loan, the lender's basis
is equal to the percentage of the construction loan which is the
same as the lender's percentage of sharing income of the project
175
entity.
Often. the lender will insist that it have no liability for the payment of the construction loan and the developer solely will be liable for the loan. In such instances, the lender can obtain a basis in
its interest in the project entity only by actually contributing capital to the project entity or agreeing to make future capital contributions which will be available for the payment of the construction
loan.' 76 There is a serious question, however, as to whether the
amounts which the lender has agreed to contribute can be included
in the lender's current basis if the lender's obligation to make such
172.
173.
174.
175.

See I.R.C. § 704(d),
See id. §§ 705, 722.
See id. § 752(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
I.R.C. § 752(c); Tress. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).

176. I.R.C. § 752(e); Trees. Reg. § 1.752-1(e). While the regulation specifically applies
only to a limited partner, there appears to be no reason why the same result would not be
obtained in the situation discussed in the text.
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contributions is conditioned on the completion of the project or
the achievement of certain occupancy standards. 7 For this reason,
a lender desiring to participate in tax losses generated during the
construction period, but unwilling to make its entire initial capital
contribution at the outset or accept any liability for payment of a
construction loan for which the developer is liable, should make
annual contributions in an amount equal to its share of the tax
losses for each year or agree unconditionally to make capital contributions on or before the anticipated completion of construction
in an amount equal to its estimated share of the construction period tax losses.
The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Battelstein v. IRS17 8 suggests an additional reason for the lender to make a substantial portion of its initial capital contributions to the project entity during
the construction period. This decision seems to establish that capital contributions are required to pay construction period interest
on a construction loan in order for the interest to be deducted currently by either the lender or developer.179 Accordingly, the careful
developer should insist that the lender make a portion of its agreed
capital contributions during the construction period in an amount
at least equal to the estimated amount of interest to be paid on the
construction loan. This technique is also important to the lender
when it participates in the construction period tax losses.1 80
177. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e); 1 W. McKan, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHEP AND PAiTNERS 7 8.03 (1977). Since future contributions may not
be required for payment of the construction loan unless the developer fails to complete the
project or fails to achieve certain occupancy standards, and since the lender will not be
obligated to make the future contributions until and unless the same conditions are met, it
is difficult to determine how such future contributions can be deemed to be available for
satisfaction of the construction loan for purposes of giving the lender a current basis in its
interest in the project entity in order to enable it to deduct losses during the construction
period.
178. See 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9840 (5th Cir. 1980).
179. See id. The court cited Burgess v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 47 (1947), which previously has formed the basis for the deductibility of interest which is, in effect, funded by the
loan, but refused to apply the Burgess reasoning to the facts in Battelstein. By so doing, the
court seems to require complete separation of the interest payment and the loan with respect to which it is paid.
180. See note 177, supra. The parties presumably would want the lender's equity contribution to be used in the project as quickly as possible to avoid additional construction
period interest. In light of the Batteistein case, however, it would appear safer to keep
enough of the lender's contribution out of the project in order to fund interest payments
during the construction period. See Battelstein v. IRS, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9840 (5th Cir. 1980).
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In most instances the developer does not make substantial capital contributions to the project entity at the outset. It is anticipated that the lender's capital contributions, combined with the
proceeds of the construction loan, will be sufficient to develop and
construct the project and cover operating deficits for a period of
time after completion of construction. The parties often agree that
the developer is obligated to contribute any additional capital necessary to complete the construction of the project and to cover operating deficits experienced during a specified period of time after
completion of construction.
3. Construction Financingand Construction Period Losses. In
some situations, the lender agrees to provide both construction and
permanent mortgage financing for the project. In most instances,
the developer obtains third-party construction financing for the
project, and the participating lender agrees to provide, or obtain,
permanent mortgage financing upon completion of the project.
If the participating lender provides construction financing for
the project, the developer's deductible tax losses during the construction period may be limited to the developer's capital contributions to the project entity during the construction period. This result occurs when the construction financing provided by the lender
is considered to constitute an equity capital contribution. 181 In that
event, the developer's basis in its interest in the project entity for
purposes of deducting losses is limited to its actual contributions.
Under the general entity theory of the Code, loans by a partner
to its partnership are treated as loans by outsiders'" except to the
extent that such loans are treated as "transfers of money or property by a partner to a partnership as contributions" in accordance
with the requirement that "[i]n all cases, the substance of the
transaction will control. ' " s Revenue Ruling 72-13518' and Revenue
Ruling 72-350185 illustrate two situations where the Service held
that putative loans by partners should be treated as equity contri181. See generally 1 W. McKmz, W. NELSON & R.

WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF

7.02[2] (1977). In this situation, there would be no liabilities
for the developer to share in under section'752 because of the re-characterization of the loan
as equity.
182. See Tress. Reg. § 1.707-1(a).
183. Id.
184. 1972-1 C.B. 200.
185. 1972-2 C.B. 394.
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1
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butions and, consequently, that such loans could not be included
in the basis of the other partners. These rulings have been characterized as overly broad, and as evidencing an attempt by the Service to expand the "thin partnership" doctrine to the tax-shelter
area. 186 Nevertheless, these rulings might be considered applicable
to an equity participation arrangement.
The "thin partnership" doctrine is discussed extensively in the
Tax Court opinions in Curtis W. Kingbay' 8 and Joseph V.
Hambuechen.1 88 As stated in Curtis W. Kingbay, the question as
to whether a loan by a partner to a partnership is to be treated as
debt or equity is to be answered on the basis of a number of
factors:
[W]hether a particular transaction creates a valid debtor-creditor
relationship or is in reality a contribution to capital is a question of
fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances with
the burden of proof on the taxpayer. Such factors as the adequacy of
the capitalization of the debtor, the issuance of notes, provision for
and payment of interest, presence or absence of a maturity date,
intention to repay, whether the debt is subordinated to claims of
outside creditors, presence or absence of security for the loan, reasonableness of expectation of repayment, use to which the funds
were put, are among those to be considered in making the
determination. 68
Most of the factors listed in the foregoing quotation will be present with respect to mortgage financing provided by lenders in
connection with equity participation arrangements. One factor
which may be of concern is the extent to which the mortgage
financing may be subordinated to the claims of other creditors by
operation of the provisions of the TULPA and the TUPA. Another
factor which may be of concern is the extent to which the mortgage
financing is non-recourse financing secured only by the project. If
the mortgage financing is subordinated to the claims of the other
creditors of the project entity and is nonrecourse, it seems that an
argument could be made that the mortgage financing is at the risk
186. See 1 W. McKEz, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMIR,
7.02, at 7-10 (1977).

FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS

AND PARTNERS

187. 46 T.C. 147, 154 (1966).

188. 43 T.C. 90, 98-99 (1964).
189. Kingbay v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 147, 154 (1966).
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of the success of the project entity in the same manner that capital
contributions would be. If, on the other hand, the mortgage financing has priority over the claims of other creditors, or the developer
has assumed liability for at least a portion of the mortgage financing, the fact that the mortgage financing would probably have the
characteristics of debt under the standards described above should
preclude a conclusion that the mortgage financing should be characterized as equity capital for tax purposes.
Where the project entity is a joint venture and the lender not
only owns its interest in the joint venture directly but also provides the construction financing for the project, the position that
the construction financing constitutes equity financing appears to
have some support in the provisions of the TUPA, because those
provisions would subordinate the lender's claims with respect to
the construction financing to the claims of third-party creditors. 19"
If the project entity is a limited partnership, however, there may
be less support for this position. The TULPA places the lender's
claims on at least a parity with those of third-party creditors of the
limited partnership and, possibly, affords the claims of the lender
for repayment of the construction financing priority over general
creditors.1 9 '
When the developer is liable for construction financing obtained
from an unrelated third party, the developer should have a basis in
its interest in the project entity sufficient to deduct its share of the
tax losses generated during the construction period. 92 A question
arises where the construction financing is provided by the participating lender and the interest in the project entity is held by a
subsidiary of the participating lender. In that event, a strong argument can be made that the lender's claims based on the construction financing should not be placed on a parity with, or subordinated to, the claims of third-party creditors. 93 Likewise, a strong
argument can be made that, if the lender does not own its interest
in the project entity directly, the construction financing provided
by the lender should not be treated as an equity capital contribu-

190. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 40 (Vernon 1970). See text accompanying
notes 129-32 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra.
192. I.R.C. § 752(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
193. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
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tion for tax purposes.
When the construction financing is obtained from a source which
is unrelated to the participating lender, the developer's basis ordinarily is equal to its share of the liability for repayment of the
construction loan. Accordingly, when the participating lender has
no liability to the construction lender, it appears that the developer should be able to include in its basis the entire amount of the
construction financing for purposes of deducting construction period losses. When the participating lender has agreed to make future capital contributions which are available for repayment of the
construction loan, however, it appears that the participating lender
should have a basis for tax purposes equal to its agreed future capital contributions. It is not entirely clear whether the participating
lender or the developer can include this portion of the liability for
the construction loan in its tax basis."e4 Nevertheless, the remaining liability for the construction financing should be sufficient for
the developer to deduct its share of the construction period
losses.' e5
A more troublesome situation is encountered when the participating lender is not only obligated to provide future capital contributions but is also obligated to the developer to provide replacement financing for the project. If the replacement financing is
deemed to constitute an equity contribution by the participating
lender for tax purposes, it seems that the developer may not have
any basis with respect to the construction financing, even if the
construction financing is obtained from an unrelated source. This
concern is compounded if the participating lender undertakes a direct obligation to the construction lender to provide the replacement financing upon the maturity of the construction financing.'" e

194. The regulations under section 752 provide that the indebtedness can be taken into
account only once and imply that, in the situation described in the text, it is the partner
obligated to make the future contributions (the lender) which is entitled to include that
portion of the indebtedness in its basis. Tress. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
195. For example, assume that the construction financing for which the developer solely

is liable is $5,000,000 and that the lender is obligated to make $1,000,000 in future equity
contributions, which would be available for the payment of construction financing. It would
appear that the developer's basis would be only $4,000,000. Any construction period losses
allocated to the developer, however, should be more than covered by that amount of basis.

196. In the situation described in the text, an argument could be made that the developer is not entitled to include any portion of the construction loan in its basis, because the
ultimate liability for repayment of the construction loan is borne by the lender based upon
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4. Obtaining Replacement Financing. The parties typically
agree that the participating lender has the responsibility for providing or obtaining replacement financing for the project at the
maturity of the construction loan. In some instances, especially
when the lender is obligated to provide replacement financing, the
parties may agree in advance as to the detailed terms and conditions of the replacement financing. In other instances, the parties
may agree that such financing will be obtained on terms and conditions generally available in the market for such financing at the
time the construction financing matures. This latter type of agreement is most common when the lender is obligated to obtain,
rather than provide, replacement financing.
A major difficulty with an agreement requiring replacement
financing be provided or obtained in accordance with prevailing
market conditions at the time the construction financing matures
is that there may not be truly comparable financing available for
purposes of ascertaining an enforceable standard. When conventional permanent mortgage loans were prevalent, such a standard
might have established an acceptable degree of certainty. Currently, however, it appears that most permanent mortgage financing is being provided in the context of negotiated transactions in
which the terms and conditions of the-mortgage financing are affected significantly by the negotiated equity participation aspects
of the transaction. 197 The wide variety of issues and agreements
involved in a typical equity participation arrangement may result
in there being no prevailing standard available to the parties for
purposes of determining the type of replacement mortgage financing which should be provided by the lender when the construction
financing matures. Therefore, when a complete advance agreement
is not possible, the parties should specify the terms they are willing
to agree upon for purposes of narrowing the areas of potential, fuits obligation to the construction lender to provide replacement financing sufficient to satisfy the construction loan.
197. See generally Kuklin, Real Estate FinancingAnd The World We (Will) Live In,
13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1116 (1978); McMahan, The Future of the Real Estate Industry: Changing Supply Patterns, 7 REAL EST. REV. 68 (1977); McMahan, The Future of
the Real Estate Industry: New Directions and New Rules, 7 REAL EST. REV. 91 (1977);
Strum, Today's Real Estate Financing Climate-Some of the Causes and Some of the
Problems, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1978).
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ture controversy and achieving some standard of comparability.19 8
Uncertainty may exist with respect to the principal amount of
replacement financing as well as the terms. For example, if the
parties initially do not agree on an applicable interest rate or other
terms which would affect debt service on the replacement financing, they will not be able to ascertain the amount of debt service
the projected operating revenues of the project will support. It is
possible, therefore, that the principal amount of the replacement
financing will be more or less than the amount of the construction
financing if it is to bear some relationship to the projected
revenues.
When the replacement financing is insufficient to retire the construction financing, a method must be provided to supply the deficit. Typically, this deficiency is supplied by loans from each of the
parties in proportion to their relative ownership percentages. Such
loans usually bear interest, often at a rate equivalent to that being
paid on the first-lien replacement financing. The interest usually is
payable only to the extent that funds are available after satisfaction of operating expenses and the debt service on the first-lien
replacement financing. In many cases, the lender may agree to loan
the developer its share of the deficiency financing. 99
When the proceeds of the replacement financing exceed the
amount required to satisfy the construction financing, the parties
may be able to make initially tax-free capital withdrawals from the
project entity. The method of distributing such excess proceeds is
determined by negotiation of the parties. Possible methods of distribution include: (1) dividing the excess proceeds in accordance
with the parties' ownership percentages; (2) paying the excess pro198. For example, if the parties agreed on the maturity and amortization period for the
replacement financing, they also may agree that the applicable interest rate should be
equivalent to the effective internal yield to maturity on exchange-traded corporate or government bonds with a corresponding maturity and specified rating. If the parties also have
agreed that projected operating income must bear a specified ratio to the debt service on the
replacement financing, the determination of the interest rate and amortization period will
enable them to determine the principal amount of the financing to be provided. While other
formulas could be devised, it appears that the important objective is to narrow the potential
for future controversies and provide a workable standard to determine what sort of replacement financing the lender will be obligated to obtain or provide when the construction
financing matures.
199. See text accompanying notes 218-19 infra, for additional considerations the parties
may wish to take into account in connection with loans by the lender to the developer of the
developer's share of such deficiency financing.
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ceeds as a return of capital contributions and then in accordance
with ownership percentages; or (3) giving the lender a preferential
distribution of the excess proceeds until its capital contributions
are recovered, and then distributing the balance first to the developer to the extent of its capital contributions, or imputed equity
value, and then in accordance with ownership percentages, or simply in accordance with the parties' ownership percentages.
To the extent that the lender assumes a significant share of the
liability represented by the replacement financing and is allowed
to include that amount in its adjusted basis for tax purposes, it
should be able to receive the excess proceeds of the replacement
financing as a tax-free capital withdrawal.200 This result should be
applicable even if the amount distributed exceeds the adjusted or
actual capital contributions of the lender.201 When the lender is
not liable for replacement financing provided by an unrelated
third-party, care should be taken to insure that the replacement
financing is non-recourse as to the developer as well.102
The developer may have significant tax difficulties with the replacement financing whether it is equal to, or more than, the
amount of the construction financing. When the replacement
financing is provided directly by the participating lender and is
deemed to constitute an equity capital contribution, the developer
may realize taxable income upon satisfaction of the construction
loan.' 0 s The amount of income which may be realized at that time

200. Distributions from the venture to the lender (or any venturer), in the situation
described in the text should not be taxable to the extent that the distributions did not
exceed the lender's basis in the venture. Such distributions do, however, reduce the lender's
basis in the venture and may, therefore, ultimately increase the amount of taxable income to
the lender. Thus, while the withdrawal may be tax-free initially, it is generally only a deferral, assuming that the venture ultimately is profitable. See generally I.R.C. §§ 705, 731(a),
733; 2 W. McKan, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS

1 19.01-.04 (1977).

201. The lender's adjusted basis (i.e., original contributions, less construction period
losses, if any, allocated to the lender) would be increased as a result of its share of the
liability. See I.R.C. § 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e). Since its basis would be in excess of its
capital contribution, the withdrawal could exceed the contribution without resulting in immediate taxation.
202. Otherwise, the lender will not be able to take into account any of the loan for
purposes of determining its basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
203. The satisfaction of the loan is a reduction in the developer's proportionate share of
the liability, resulting in a deemed distribution to the developer. See I.R.C. § 752(b). The
deemed distribution reduces the venturer's basis (not below zero), with any amounts
deemed distributed in excess of its basis being taxable gain under section 731(a). I.R.C.
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would consist of the entire amount of the developer's tax losses
and capital withdrawals during the construction period,'" calculated as follows. Assume that the portion of the construction
financing for which the developer is liable is $5,000,000 and the
developer's deductible losses and capital withdrawals during the
construction period are $500,000. At the time the construction loan
is satisfied, therefore, the developer has a basis of $4,500,000 in its
interest in the project entity. If the replacement financing provided
by the participating lender is treated as equity capital for tax purposes, the developer is relieved of $5,000,000 in liabilities, resulting
in a deemed distribution to the developer of $5,000,000. Since the
deemed distribution exceeds the developer's adjusted basis by
$500,000, the developer has realized income in this amount. By
way of contrast, if the replacement financing of $5,000,000 were
obtained from an unrelated source, and the developer were allowed
to include one-half of that liability in its basis, it would not realize
income. The reduction in the developer's share of the liabilities of
the project entity would then be only $2,500,000, well below the
developer's basis of $4,500,000. In addition, the developer would
have a remaining basis of $2,000,000 in its interest in the project
entity.
This analysis is also applicable to the developer's share of the
excess proceeds of the replacement financing. If the replacement
financing provided by the participating lender is held to constitute
an equity capital contribution, the refinancing proceeds distributed
to the developer constitute taxable income.20 If the replacement
financing is treated as a loan for tax purposes, the developer may
receive such excess proceeds as a tax-free withdrawal of capital.2 6
5. Initial Compensation to Developer. In instances where the
lender has agreed to contribute equity capital in excess of the
amount required to develop and construct the project, the excess
§§ 731(a), 752(b).

204. Both tax losses and capital withdrawals would have resulted in reductions in the
developer's basis. See I.R.C. §§ 705, 733.
205. The statement in the text assumes that the developer has not made any capital
contributions. In that event, the developer would not have any basis in its interest in the
project entity and the withdrawals automatically would constitute distributions in excess of
the developer's basis.

206. The developer would include its proportionate share of the loan in its basis and
would be able to withdraw the excess proceeds since the withdrawal presumably would not
be in excess of its basis. See note 201 supra.
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funds are usually intended by the parties as compensation to the
developer for its services in connection with the project's development and construction. Some method is required to enable the developer to receive such funds in the form of fees and other payments or capital withdrawals.2 7 A developer usually prefers to
receive its initial compensation in the form of tax-free capital withdrawals of the available mortgage and equity financing which exceeds the actual cost of development and construction of the project. The lender may agree to this procedure, especially when the
lender does not participate in the tax losses generated by the project and the parties have agreed to specially allocate gain on sale of
the project to the developer in the amount of the developer's capital withdrawals. When the lender participates in the tax losses generated by the project, however, ordinarily it prefers that the developer's initial compensation be paid in the form of fees rather than
capital withdrawals, regardless of whether the fees are deductible
immediately or must be capitalized2 0o
When the developer's initial compensation is received in the
form of capital withdrawals, such amount does not generate immediate tax deductions and is not added to the project entity's tax
basis for purposes of being reflected in future depreciation deductions.2 0 9 If the developer's initial compensation is received in the
form of fees, however, the lender receives the benefit of depreciation or amortization deductions with respect to those fees, even if
207. Unlike the typical tax-shelter real estate syndication, the typical equity participation arrangement generally does not involve the payment of various fees to the developer
which are structured in an effort to obtain maximum tax losses in the early years of the
project. Generally, however, the developer will receive some amounts at the outset and the
parties will, or could be, in conflicting positions regarding the structure of the payments. For
example, the developer will generally not want to increase its income subject to immediate
taxation by the receipt of fees; however, the lender will want to obtain a deduction or at
least an increase in basis in the project for any payments made to the developer. The lender
would not be able to achieve its objective if the amounts were treated as capital withdrawals
by the parties.
208. See note 207 supra. Fees or other amounts paid prior to the time the project is
placed in service may not be deductible since the partnership (formed to own the project)
was not engaged in a trade or business until rentals were received. See Goodwin v. Commissioner, No. 12561-71 (T.C. Dec. 29, 1980). But see Blitzer v. United States, No. 426-76, (Ct.
Cl. Mar. 12, 1981).
209. Since a capital withdrawal is, by definition, not a payment made to a partner other
than in its capacity as a partner, it cannot be characterized as a payment for services of
either a capital or non-capital nature. See I.R.C. §§ 707(a), 731(a).
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the fees are paid for construction or other services not qualifying
for immediate deductibility.2 10 Accordingly, a lender which participates in the tax deductions generated by the project is usually reluctant to allow the developer to receive its initial compensation in
the form of capital withdrawals, insisting that such compensation
be structured in the form of fees.
Where the construction financing is obtained from an unrelated
third-party lender and only equity financing is provided by the
participating lender, the developer should be able to make tax-free
capital withdrawals from the project entity during the construction
period. Care should be taken, however, to assure that the developer's share of the actual, outstanding liability for the construction
financing exceeds the amount of the capital withdrawals, thus
preventing the withdrawals from exceeding the amount of the developer's basis and the occurrence of an immediate taxable event.
When the participating lender provides both equity financing
and construction financing, the developer may not be able to make
any tax-free capital withdrawals. If the construction financing is
considered to be an equity contribution by the participating
lender, the developer may not include any of the liability represented by the construction financing in its tax basis. Therefore,
any capital withdrawals by the developer would exceed its basis
and immediately be taxable.2 "
Where the construction financing is obtained from an unrelated
source and the replacement financing is provided by the participating lender at the maturity of the construction loan, the developer
may realize taxable income at that time in an amount equal to its
capital withdrawals. Capital withdrawals reduce or eliminate the
developer's tax basis attributable to its share of the liability represented by the construction financing. Therefore, when the construction financing is satisfied with the proceeds of the replacement financing, the developer realizes income as a result of a
deemed distribution, unless the developer's adjusted basis after the
210. Such amounts presumably would be amortized over the period of time which the
developer's obligation giving rise to the fee is performable, or, if the fee is paid for general
services (e.g., a "development fee"), it presumably would be added to the project entity's
basis in the project and depreciated over the life of the project. Some of such fees may be
amortized over a 60 month period pursuant to section 102 of the Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 (1980).
211. See I.R.C. § 731(a).
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construction period losses and capital withdrawals are deducted is
more than the amount by which the developer's share of the construction financing exceeds its share of the replacement refinancing.212 Where, however, the replacement financing is provided by
the participating lender and is considered to be equity financing
for tax purposes, the developer would be unable to include any
share of the liability for the replacement financing in its tax basis.
In that event, the developer would be deemed to have been relieved of liabilities equal to the construction financing, resulting in
a deemed distribution to the developer of the amount by which the
construction financing exceeded its basis at the end of the construction period.
6. Handling Cost Overruns. The developer is usually obligated
to provide funds necessary to cover cost overruns incurred during
the construction period. Such cost overruns consist of either direct
construction costs or costs such as construction period interest and
taxes.
In many instances, the developer or its affiliate acts as the construction contractor with respect to the project, and enters into a
construction contract with the project entity. Such construction
contract can provide for the payment of either a "cost plus"
amount or a "fixed fee" construction price.
If a "cost plus" construction contract is used, the developer ordinarily will be obligated to make capital contributions to the project
entity to the extent required to make payments to the construction
contractor in excess of the amount originally estimated by the parties in determining the initial funding needed for the project. This
procedure allows the project entity to include the full amount paid
for construction of the project in its basis for purposes of calculating depreciation. The parties, therefore, should consider whether
the developer is to receive a greater share of the tax losses generated by the additional depreciation attributable to such additional
contributions or simply the amount calculated pursuant to the
standard agreed method of allocating losses, notwithstanding the
developer's additional contributions.
If the construction contract is a "fixed fee" type contract, the
construction contractor may realize a profit or loss on the contract.
To the extent a profit is realized, the contractor must recognize
212. See id.
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ordinary income. Where the construction contractor realizes a loss,
a question is raised as to whether the contractor is entitled to deduct it as an ordinary loss, or if such amount should be treated as
an additional capital contribution by the developer and added to
its basis for tax purposes. 1 ' Although there is some authority to
the contrary, 214 it is believed that the loss should not be treated as
a capital contribution by the developer. Since the parties could
have agreed on a "cost plus" contract, under which that result
would be appropriate, but decided against it through their negotiations, the agreement of the parties to use a fixed fee contract has a
valid business purpose and should be recognized.
Other construction period costs such as interest and taxes are
usually funded by capital contributions by the developer to the extent that they exceed the amounts originally projected. Again, the
developer should obtain an agreement from the lender to specially
allocate these excess costs to the developer for tax purposes. As a
special 'allocation of these costs is easily identifiable and presents
fewer administrative burdens than a special allocation of additional depreciation deductions, the lender may be more willing to
agree to such an allocation than it would be with respect to additional depreciation deductions.
7. Distribution of Operating Net Cash Flow. Determining the
manner of distributing the operating net cash flow of the project is
primarily a matter of business negotiation. While a variety of
methods for making such distributions are used, most of such
methods do not appear to present any particular tax or legal
problems.
In some situations the lender requires a return on its equity in213. It would appear that in instances where the developer attempts to make tax-free
capital withdrawals from the project entity, the construction contract will be scrutinized
carefully to determine if it was set at a realistic amount or at an amount which would increase the opportunity of the developer to make such withdrawals. Assuming that the contract was set at a reasonable amount, however, and that the ultimate loss arose because of
unforeseen circumstances, the question arises as to whether the loss should be treated as an
ordinary business loss by the contractor or a capital contribution by the developer. In the
latter event, the amount would be added to the developer's tax basis. See Edward T. Dicker,
22 T.C.M. 345 (1963).
214. Id. While the, court held against the Service on a similar issue, the opinion can be
read to suggest that, in the event the factual circumstances involved in the case indicate
other than an arm's length transaction, it may be a closer question. Id. at 351-54. The case
has been cited by a revenue agent in a recent audit in which the authors have been involved
in support of the capital contribution theory.
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vested in the project in a specified amount either indefinitely or for
a specified period of time regardless of the actual net cash flow of
the project. Such an arrangement may present some problems. For
example, there is a question as to whether such an arrangement
might result in the receipt of immediately taxable guaranteed
payments by the lender.215 To the extent such distributions to the
lender represent capital withdrawals of funds contributed by
lender it is unlikely that the excess distributions would be treated
as taxable guaranteed payments. This rationale seems to extend
not only to withdrawals of unused capital contributions made by
the lender but also to unneeded portions of construction and replacement mortgage financing.' The same reasoning also may apply to capital withdrawals made by the lender from funds which
the developer recontributed to the .project entity to the extent such
amounts represented capital withdrawals originally made by the
developer. There seems to be some doubt, however, as to whether
funds distributed to the lender in excess of the foregoing amounts
may be treated as capital withdrawals when the developer had to
contribute money to the project entity in order to make such funds
available. Even greater doubt exists when the so-called "capital
withdrawals" made by the lender exceed the equity capital it
originally contributed to the project entity.11 7 In the event the
lender receives distributions which might be held to constitute
guaranteed payments, it also should require that losses or deductions equivalent to the amount of guaranteed payments be specially allocated within the project entity to the lender in order to
offset the income attributable to the guaranteed payments.
8. Responsibility for OperatingDeficits. In many instances, the
215. See I.R.C. § 707(c). To the extent made without regard to income, payments to a
partner for the use of capital are considered made to one who is not a partner, for among
other things, purposes of inclusion in the income of the recipient. See Tress. Reg. § 1.7071(c). See also 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS. AND
PARTNERS I 13.03[21[b] (1977). It is important that the distribution reduce the recipients'
capital account if the payment is to be treated as a return of, rather than a return on,
capital. See I.R.C. §§ 707(c), 731(a).

216. See I.R.C. §§ 707(c), 731(a).
217. Where the lender receives distributions which are funded with contributions by
the developer in excess of amounts, if any, previously withdrawn by the developer, and the
lender previously has received distributions which equal or exceed the lender's original contributions, an argument can be made that the lender is receiving a guaranteed payment for
the use of the capital it originally contributed rather than a return of its capital. See id. §
707(c).
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developer agrees to provide the project entity with sufficient funds
to defray operating deficits realized in connection with the project,
either indefinitely or for a specified period of time. The parties
may agree that the developer can recover the amounts advanced
from the future net cash flow of the project or the proceeds of sale
or refinancing of the project. On the other hand, the developer may
not be entitled to any form of recoupment. After a specified period
of time, the parties usually become jointly obligated to provide the
necessary funds to defray operating deficits in proportion to their
respective ownership percentages. Such funds may or may not be
subject to recoupment. The developer should request that the
lender agree to a special allocation of tax losses to the developer to
the extent it is required to make disproportionate contributions, as
opposed to loans, to the project entity to defray operating deficits.
The parties should also consider the proper procedure to follow
when one of the parties is unable to provide its share of the funds
required to defray operating deficits. The developer is usually the
party concerned with this problem, as it is more likely to experience difficulties in. meeting its obligations. Assuming that the
lender is willing to agree to loan the required funds to the developer on an interest-bearing basis, factors which should be
addressed are: (1) the method of repaying the loan; and (2) the
extent to which the developer should be penalized for failing to
meet its obligations.
When the lender agrees to make a loan to the developer of its
share of operating deficits, the lender may insist on receiving all
distributions which the developer would otherwise be entitled to
receive until the lender has received the full amount of the principal and interest owed by the developer. When such an agreement
is reached, it should also provide that the distributions received by
the lender as payment of the developer's indebtedness be treated
as distributions to the developer by the project entity for tax and
accounting purposes.118
In some instances, the lender may insist on an incentive provi218. If the distributions were not so treated, the lender could receive income for tax
purposes on the amount of distributions which are being paid as a result of the indebtedness, which would not appear warranted. It would seem that the better result would be to
have the developer bear the consequences of the distributions for tax and accounting purposes (at least with respect to its interest in the partnership).
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sion in the agreement in order to discourage the developer from
taking advantage of the right to borrow its share of funds required
to defray operating deficits from the lender. For example, the
lender may require that it be entitled to receive the distributions
which the developer would otherwise be entitled to receive until
the lender has received not only the principal and interest on the
loan but also an additional amount typically specified in terms of a
percentage of the loan amount. Such an agreement, however, appears to raise a usury problem, at least to the extent that the extra
amount plus the stated interest payable on the loan exceeds the
maximum rate of interest allowed by law.21 9 This problem might
be avoided by providing for a temporary reallocation of profits
within the project entity and designating the extra amount as a
distribution to the lender rather than the developer for tax and
accounting purposes.
9. Allocation of Operating Income and Losses. When the net
cash flow of the project is to be distributed to the parties in accordance with their relative ownership percentages, an allocation of
the net taxable income of the project to the parties in accordance
with their relative ownership percentages should not present any
problems. If, however, the lender is to receive a preferential distribution of the net cash flow, the developer will want the net taxable
income to be distributed in proportion to the distributions of net
cash flow to the extent of the total net cash flow, with only the
remaining amount of taxable income, if any, being allocated to the
parties in accordance with their relative ownership percentages. 2
This procedure avoids the possibility of the developer's having to
pay tax on a portion of the taxable income with respect to a period
when the lender received all or substantially all of the net cash
flow of the project as a result of its preferential distributions.
To be effective for tax purposes, a special allocation of the net
operating tax losses must have substantial economic effect."s 1 As
an example, it seems that a special allocation of operating losses to
the developer to the extent it provided funds to defray operating
219. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
220. Where there previously has been a special allocation of losses to one of the parties,
consideration might be given to a special allocation of income in excess of net cash flow to
that party until the capital accounts of the parties have been restored to a position proportionate to their relative ownership percentages.

221. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
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deficits of the project would have substantial economic effect, since
such funds were expended by the project entity and gave rise to
this portion of its operating tax losses. Correspondingly, substantial economic effect should exist with respect to a special allocation
of operating tax losses to a lender which provided all, or substantially all, of the equity capital contributions, at least to the extent
of its equity capital contributions. Beyond such amount, it seems
that substantial economic effect is present only if the special allocation of losses can affect the manner in which the proceeds of the
sale of the project would be distributed.22
One potentially troublesome problem arising in connection with
the allocation of operating losses relates to accelerated depreciation and the recapture of excess depreciation on the sale or other
disposition of the project. Unless specific provision is made in the
equity participation agreement, there may be a question as to what
portion of the gain allQcated to one of the parties upon the sale of
the project is to be treated as ordinary income attributable to recapture of excess depreciation and what portion is to be treated as
long-term capital gain.22 8 Accordingly, the agreement should pro-

vide how such excess depreciation is deemed to have been allocated between the parties initially and that amount should be the
first to be allocated to the parties upon the sale of the project. One
method of accomplishing this result is to provide that the excess
depreciation for each year is to be deemed to have been allocated
to the parties in the same proportion that they shared the income
or loss of the project entity for such year.
10. Distributionof Sale Proceeds. A variety of agreements are
reached by developers and lenders as to the methods in which the
proceeds of the sale of the project are to be distributed. Often,
however, these agreements fail to consider adequately other aspects of the equity participation agreement.
In a typical situation, the lender insists that the proceeds of the
222. See generally 1 W. McKn, W. NELSON & R.
10.02 (1977 & Supp. 1981).

WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNER-

SHIPS AND PARTNERS

223. The recapture problem discussed here is only with respect to depreciation on sec-

tion 1250 property which exceeds an amount which would have been allocated under the
straight line method; that is the difference between straight line and the method of acceler-

ated depreciation used by the partnership. I.R.C. § 1250(b). "Excess depreciation," as used
in the text, refers to the difference between depreciation taken under the straight line
method and an accelerated method.
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sale of the project be distributed first to the lender until it has
recovered its capital contributions to the project entity. The lender
may agree that its capital contributions can be reduced for this
purpose by the proceeds of refinancing or other interim capital
transactions previously received by the lender. In rare instances, a
lender also may agree that its capital contributions can be reduced
for this purpose by net cash flow distributions previously received
in excess of its agreed preferential amount of net cash flow distributions. After the lender has received its unrecovered capital contributions, the balance of the proceeds of the sale may be distributed first to the developer until it has received a subordinated
preferential amount and then in accordance with ownership percentages, or may simply be distributed in accordance with the parties' relative ownership percentages.
The difficulty with this traditional method of distributing sale
proceeds is that it does not take into account the status of the parties' capital accounts at the time of the sale. As a result, such
method may fail to provide substantial economic effect for any
agreed special allocations of losses,"14 as well as produce an inequi-

table result. Described below is a method of distributing the proceeds of the sale which it is believed will avoid both of these
problems without unduly hindering the achievement of the parties'
objectives.
Immediately prior to the sale of the project, the capital accounts
of the parties reflect an updated history of the operations of the
project entity, including contributions, distributions, losses, and income. Accordingly, if a party has a positive capital account, that
party has made capital contributions or received allocations of income which have exceeded its distributions and allocations of
losses. Conversely, if a party has a negative capital account, that
party has received distributions or allocations of losses which have
exceeded its contributions and allocations of income. It seems only
equitable that the proceeds of the sale be used first to place the
parties in a position commensurate with their relative ownership
percentages in the project entity. In addition, this same procedure
seems to be necessary in order for any special allocation of losses
to have the requisite substantial economic effect.
224. See generally 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNER110.02 (1977 & Supp. 1981).

SHIPS AND PARTNERS
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For example, assume that the lender originally contributed
$2,000,000 and the developer originally contributed $2,000,000,
that the developer has a positive capital account at the time of the
sale of $500,000, that the lender has a negative capital account at
the time of the sale of $1,500,000 resulting from tax losses and cash
flow distributions, that the lender and the developer each own a
50% interest in the project entity, that the net proceeds of the sale
are $6,000,000, and that the gain realized on the sale is $7,000,000.
If the lender receives the first $2,000,000, the developer receives
the next $2,000,000, and they equally divide the remaining
$2,000,000, the lender would have a negative capital account of
$4,500,000 and the developer would have a negative capital account of $2,500,000 after the proceeds are distributed and before
the gain is allocated. Presumably, the $7,000,000 gain realized on
the sale would be allocated $2,500,000 to the developer and
$4,500,000 to the lender, so that the capital accounts would be
brought to zero. The developer would have received $3,000,000 in
proceeds and $2,500,000 in gain, and the lender would have received $3,000,000 in proceeds and $4,500,000 in gain. While the developer does not recognize gain on the $500,000 of previously taxed
income it had in its capital account in the project entity immediately prior to the sale, the lender does recognize additional gain
with respect to its $1,500,000 negative capital account resulting
from tax-free distributions or allocations of losses previously received by the lender. It appears, however, that such method of distribution is neither equitable nor results in substantial economic
effect sufficient to support the allocation of losses previously made
to the lender.
A better method of distribution would be the following. First,
the developer would receive $500,000 to eliminate its positive capital account and $1,500,000 to equalize the capital accounts of the
parties. The lender would receive the next $2,000,000. The remaining $2,000,000 would be divided equally between the parties. 25
225. It should be noted that the manner of distributing the $4,000,000 remaining after
the capital accounts have been equalized is not critical. That amount could, for example, be
distributed equally between. the parties. As noted in the following portions of the text the
use of proceeds to the extent necessary to equalize the capital accounts is the critical aspect
of the distribution formula. The example simply illustrates the typical situation where the
lender wishes to recover its unrecovered capital contributions before the developer recovers
its contributions or makes any profits on the transaction.
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The developer would then have a negative capital account of
$2,500,000 and the lender would have a negative capital account of
$4,500,000. The $7,000,000 gain could be allocated to the parties in
these amounts in order to restore their capital accounts to zero.
The developer would have received $3,000,000 in proceeds and
$2,500,000 in gain and the lender would have received $3,000,000
in proceeds and $4,500,000 in gain.
In the foregoing example both methods produce exactly the
same ultimate distributions of proceeds and allocation of gain.
While this is usually the result when the proceeds of the sale equal
or exceed the original contributions of the parties, the true test of
substantial economic effect is the result when the proceeds of the
sale do not equal or exceed the original contributions of the parties. 22 6 Accordingly, assume the facts of the foregoing example, ex-

cept that the proceeds of the sale are only $2,000,000 and the gain
is only $3,000,000. Under the first method of distribution, the
lender would receive the entire $2,000,000 proceeds and the developer would receive none, resulting in a negative capital account of
$3,500,000 for the lender and a positive capital account of $500,000
for the developer. If the $3,000,000 gain is all allocated to the
lender, the parties are left in the awkward position of having a
negative capital account of $500,000 for the lender and a positive
capital account of $500,000 for the developer. If the agreement for
the project entity provides that the parties are not responsible for
restoring negative capital accounts, the developer will have sustained a $500,000 loss on the transaction. Moreover, in such a situation, it is likely that the Service will challenge the allocation of
losses to the lender as not having substantial economic effect."27
The second distribution method would produce a more equitable
and defensible result. The entire $2,000,000 in sale proceeds would
be distributed to the developer, first to eliminate its $500,000 positive capital account and then to equalize its negative capital account with the lender's $1,500,000 negative capital account. The
$3,000,000 gain would then simply be allocated equally to the
226. Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 403 (1970), a/I'd, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069 (9th
Cir. 1973).
227. See generally 1 W. McKEE, W.'NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS I 10.02[2][b] (1977). See also Private Letter Rul. 80-08054 (National
Office Technical Advice Memorandum, Nov. 28, 1979).
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parties.
11. Allocation of Gain and Loss on Sale. One method for allocating gain arising from the sale of the project is in accordance
with the sale proceeds to the extent thereof, and then in accor.dance with negative capital accounts. If the sale proceeds have
been distributed in a manner which produces negative capital accounts for the parties which are proportionate to the parties relative ownership percentages in the project entity, this procedure
will result in the allocation of the non-cash gain in accordance with
those relative ownership percentages. If the proceeds are not sufficient to produce negative capital accounts which are proportionate
to the parties' relative ownership percentages, the allocation of the
non-cash gain in accordance with negative capital accounts will
still produce an appropriate result, since the disproportionately
larger amount of non-cash gain allocated to one or the other of the
parties will reflect additional loss allocations or tax-free distributions received by that party which were disproportionately larger
than its relative ownership percentage. In general, therefore, this
method of allocating gain on the sale of the project will produce a
fair and logical result.
The parties also should consider special allocations of gain to reflect certain events which may have occurred prior to the sale of
the project. Examples of this type of event include: (1) where the
project is under construction at the time it is conveyed to the project entity and the liability on the construction loan exceeds the
developer's basis for tax purposes in the project at that time, due
to construction period losses claimed by the developer which were
funded with the proceeds of the construction loan or withdrawals
by the developer of proceeds of the construction loan in excess of
the amounts spent for capital costs; (2) where one of the parties
received a tax-free distribution of the net proceeds of a refinancing
which is disproportionate to its relative ownership percentage; and
(3) where one of the parties has received special allocations of tax
losses in excess of its capital contributions resulting in a disproportionately large negative capital account. In each of these situations,
the parties may believe that it is only fair that the first gain realized from the sale of the project be allocated to the party which
received the benefit of the prior event.
This type of special allocation of gain on sale probably will be
acceptable to the parties to the extent that the gain attributable to
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the amount by which the mortgage financing on the project at the
time of sale exceeds the tax basis in the project at that time is
considered to be realized in the year of sale.228 In that event, the
gain realized in the year of sale will include both the amount by
which the mortgage exceeds the project's basis and the amount of
any cash sale proceeds received in the year of sale. Consequently,
the special allocation of the gain attributable to the mortgage in
excess of basis to the party benefiting from the events which resulted in the mortgage being in excess of the basis and the allocation of any additional gain in accordance with the distribution of
the cash proceeds received in the year of sale should produce the
correct result.
It can make a significant difference to the parties whether the
proceeds of the sale are distributed before or after the gain is allocated. Since many equity participation arrangements will involve
some type of special allocation of losses, it is believed that a
method which distributes the proceeds of the sale before the gain
is allocated will be more likely to provide the necessary substantial
economic effect required to support such special allocations.'2 ' In
any event, the agreement between the parties should specify
clearly the order in which the distribution of proceeds and the allocation of gain should be accomplished.
C.

Analysis of Convertible Mortgage Arrangement

A convertible mortgage arrangement is one in which the participating lender does not own an interest in the project at the outset
228. When taxpayers attempted in the past to defer gain attributable to the extent

their mortgage exceeded their basis in real property by use of a wrap-around mortgage sale
transaction, it was possible that gains realized in the year of sale would reflect only a portion
of the amount by which the mortgage exceeded the basis in the project. In that event, the
party benefiting from the transactions which gave rise to the mortgage in excess of basis
should have obtained an agreement that the corresponding gain would not be allocated to
that party until that portion of the gain was actually reported with respect to the sale. Such

an agreement was seldom made, however, which resulted in many situations where one
party received cash proceeds of the sale in the year of sale in excess of the gain allocated to

it and the other party received a substantial gain allocation and little or no cash in the year
of sale. In view of the fact that it now appears difficult, if not impossible, to obtain such a
deferral by using a wrap-around mortgage transaction, this anamoly probably will not be

encountered in the future. See Temp. Treas. Regs. § 15A.453-1(b)(3)(ii), T.D. 7768 (Jan. 30,
1981).
229. See text accompanying notes 224-26 supra.
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but has a right to convert all or a part of its mortgage into an
ownership interest in the project in the future.
1. Operations Prior to Conversion. With one possible exception, it appears that the operations of the project during the period
prior to the lender's conversion of its mortgage are substantially
the same as when the developer owns the project and the lender is
simply providing the mortgage financing for the project without
having an option to convert all or part of its mortgage financing
into an ownership interest in the project. The developer should be
able to take advantage of the benefits generated by the project
during the early years of its existence without being subject to the
kinds of limitations and restrictions which might be applicable in
an initial ownership arrangement.
The one possible exception to the foregoing pattern is when the
mortgage financing provided by the lender is nonrecourse financing
secured only by the project, and the lender has only an option to
convert all of the mortgage financing into an interest in the project. In that event, Revenue Ruling 72-350230 indicates that the
Service might not allow the mortgage financing provided by the
lender to be included in the developer's tax basis in the project. As
a result, the extent to which the developer could deduct depreciation on the project and receive tax-free net cash flow from the project would be limited to the amount of capital which the developer
provided for the project in excess of the mortgage financing.
In some cases, the lender may not be willing to convert the entire amount of the mortgage financing into an ownership interest
in the project. In such instances, it appears that the reduction in
basis which the developer may suffer due to the implications of
Revenue Ruling 72-350 31 would be limited to the portion of the
mortgage financing which the lender is willing to convert. The developer should still, however, be able to claim reduced amounts of
depreciation and receive reduced amounts of tax-free net cash flow
from the project proportionate to the amount of the mortgage
financing which is not converted.
There may be some logic for treating the mortgage financing
provided by the lender as an equity capital contribution in the
context of an initial ownership arrangement, particularly if the

230. 1972-2 C.B. 394.
231. Id.
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project entity is a joint venture. It does not appear, however, that
there is any logic to the implication of Revenue Ruling 72-350 that
mortgage financing provided by the lender in a convertible mortgage arrangement should be treated as an equity capital contribution.2 Neither the TULPA nor the TUPA appear to impose any
restrictions on the priority of the mortgage financing provided by
the participating lender in a convertible mortgage arrangement
prior to the time the mortgage financing is converted.2
In addi-

tion, it is unlikely that the Service would allow the participating
lender to claim depreciation and other deductions generated by the
project during the period prior to the conversion.23 If the transaction is viewed from the perspective of the developer, so that Revenue Ruling 72-350 is interpreted as simply not allowing the developer to include the convertible mortgage financing in its basis in
the project because the participating lender and not the developer
bears the risk of loss with respect to the mortgage financing, no
logical reason is perceived why that rule should apply just because
the lender has a right of conversion when it would not apply if the

lender made the same nonrecourse loan without an accompanying

right of conversion.2 For the foregoing reasons, although developers should be aware of the potential problems of Revenue Ruling
72-350 in connection with a convertible mortgage arrangement, it

is believed that a persuasive argument can be made that the devel232. Until the conversion is made, which is solely in the control of the lender, the mortgage financing is not at the risk of the project in the same manner as it would be as an
equity contribution.
233. Prior to the conversion, the lender would not be a partner and the terms of the
TULPA and TUPA with respect to priority of claims or judgments presumably would not
apply. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, §§ 14, 24, & art. 6132b, § 40 (Vernon 1970).
This assumes, of course, that the relationship between the parties prior to the conversion
would not be structured in a manner which could be deemed to constitute a partnership for
the purposes of either act.
234. The argument of the Service, in this regard, normally would be that the economic
benefits and burdens of ownership did not fall on the lender, and that it did not use or hold
the property in a trade or business. Of course, it is unlikely that the lender would have
claimed any'depreciation or other deductions in connection with the project prior to the
time it converted. If the Service disallows the developer's deductions during the pre-conversion period and the lender amends its returns for open years, claiming deductions for that
period, the Service would likely take inconsistent positions with respect to the lender and
the developer.
235. See generally 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
7.01[3] (1977) (discussing Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14
(1947)).
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oper should not be precluded from including the mortgage financing in its basis prior to conversion.
2. Tax Effects of Conversion. If the mortgage financing is nonrecourse financing which is all subject to conversion and the developer is not allowed to include any of the mortgage financing in its
basis in the project prior to conversion, it appears that the conversion of the mortgage financing into an ownership interest in the
project would not have any tax effect on the developer. The developer would not have been allowed previously to take advantage of
any tax benefits which were related to the convertible mortgage
financing. It is difficult to determine, therefore, that the mortgage
financing properly would be treated as part of the proceeds of the
sale realized by the developer upon the conversion of the mortgage
financing. It certainly seems inequitable to treat the convertible
mortgage financing as equity capital prior to the conversion and
then to treat it as true mortgage financing upon the conversion for
purposes of calculating gain realized by the developer as a result of
the conversion.
It may be, on the other hand, that all of the mortgage financing
is subject to conversion, but that fact did not preclude the developer from including the mortgage financing in its tax basis in the
project, either because Revenue Ruling 72-350 is determined to be
incorrect or inapplicable or because the developer was liable for
the mortgage financing.2 3 6 In that event, the conversion of all or a
portion of the mortgage financing by means of a conveyance of an
interest in the project by the developer to the lender in consideration for a reduction of all or part of the mortgage financing should
produce the same tax effect for the developer as the sale of an interest in the project would produce. The portion of the mortgage
converted by the lender would be deemed to be the proceeds of the
sale and the basis which the developer had in the project would be
allocated between the interest in the project which the developer
retains and the interest in the project which the developer conveys
to the lender as a result of the conversion. The gain realized by the
developer would be determined in the same manner as if the
lender had paid the developer cash equal to the amount of the
mortgage being converted and the developer had used that cash to

236. See I.R.C. § 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
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pay all or a portion of the mortgage financing.23 7 As might be suspected, this procedure may produce gain for the developer far in
excess of the amount anticipated by the parties.
For example, assume that the developer obtains $5,000,000 in
mortgage financing from the lender, that the financing is convertible in its entirety into a 50% ownership interest in the project, and
that the developer's basis for tax purposes in the project immediately prior to the conversion is $5,000,000. As a result of the conversion, the developer will be considered to have received proceeds
in the amount of $5,000,000 for the sale of a 50% interest in the
project. Since the developer will be deemed to have a basis of only
$2,500,000 in the 50% interest in the project which was acquired
by the lender as a result of the conversion, the developer will have
realized a gain of $2,500,000 as a result of the conversion. Probably
few developers would anticipate such an adverse result in a situation such as this. Since the result clearly would be correct if the
developer had sold a 50% interest in the project for $5,000,000 and
then used the proceeds to satisfy a $5,000,000 mortgage loan on the
project, there is no apparent justification for reaching a different
result in connection with the convertible mortgage as illustrated in
the foregoing example.
The tax consequences in the example given above would be less
onerous if the lender had converted only part of its mortgage
financing into an ownership interest in the project. As a practical
matter, however, the developer would not be willing to give the
lender an ownership interest in the project equal to the same percentage as the percentage which the portion of the mortgage
financing to be converted represents of the total mortgage financing. For example, the developer is unlikely to agree to give the
lender a right to convert 20% of the mortgage financing into a
20% ownership interest in the project, because such an agreement
would not give any recognition to the value of the developer's equity interest in the project. Only in this manner, however, would
the developer be able to avoid recognition of gain on the conver237. Cf. Byram v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1977) (illustrating require-

ment that basis be allocated). If the partnership rules were applicable, the conversion by the
lender (and consequent reduction in the developer's share of liabilities) would be considered

a deemed distribution to the developer and would reduce the developer's basis through operation of sections 731, 733, and 752. See I.R.C. §§ 731(1), 733, 752(b). To the extent the
deemed distribution exceeded the developer's basis, it would be taxable. See I.R.C. § 731(a).
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sion of the mortgage as illustrated above. 8 8 In any situation where
the lender receives an ownership interest in the project as a result
of the conversion which is less than the percentage which the converted portion of the mortgage financing represents of the total
mortgage financing, the developer will be required to recognize a
significant amount of gain, unless all or a portion of the gain is
offset by additional basis attributable to capital provided by the
developer in excess of the convertible mortgage financing provided
by the lender.
The amount of gain required to be recognized by the developer
would be increased to the extent that the developer's basis in the
project immediately prior to the conversion was less than the
amount of the mortgage financing. 8 In that event, gain also would
have to be recognized by the developer even if the ownership percentage interest acquired by the lender was equal to the percentage which the converted portion of the mortgage financing repre2 40
sented of the total mortgage financing.
It appears that the adverse tax consequences of a direct conversion of the mortgage financing may be avoided or reduced, if the
parties utilize a partnership to accomplish the conversion. This
technique would involve the formation of a partnershp comprised
of the developer and lender prior to accomplishing the conversion.
The developer would contribute the project to the partnership subject to the mortgage and the lender would contribute money to the
partnership in the amount of the agreed reduction in the mortgage.

238. The portion of the developer's basis attributable to the portion of the project obtained by the lender is the same when stated as a percentage - e.g., 20% of the developer's
basis is attributable to 20% of the project being obtained by the lender. The developer's
basis must be apportioned or spread across its entire interest. Presumably, when considering
an undivided interest in the entire project or an interest in a venture, the percentage being
sold or converted would be the applicable percentage of the basis to be taken into account
to determine gain. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a). Thus, if the developer has not made an
equity investment, the maximum basis it could have would be 100% of the loan, spread over
the entire project. If the percentage of the mortgage being converted is greater than the

percentage of the project being obtained, the developer will have gain if it has not made
sufficient capital contributions to offset that difference.
239. Construction period losses taken into account by the developer could reduce its
basis below the amount of the mortgage financing.
240. In any case where the portion of the mortgage converted exceeded the developer's

basis attributable to the interest acquired by the lender, the developer presumably would be
required to recognize gain. See generally 1 W. McKEs, W.
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
4.03[2] (1977).
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The partnership would then apply the money contributed by the
lender to the mortgage. The developer would receive a deemed distribution at the time the project is contributed in an amount equal
to a percentage of the mortgage which is the same as the lender's
ownership percentage in the partnership. 2 1 The developer would
receive an additional deemed distribution in an amount equal to a
percentage of the amount by which the mortgage is reduced with
the funds contributed by the lender which is the same as the developer's ownership percentage interest in the partnership.2 4 2 If the
entire mortgage is converted in this manner, therefore, the developer will receive a deemed distribution equal to the amount of the
mortgage. It seems that the only gain recognized by the developer,
however, would be the amount by which the mortgage financing
exceeded the developer's basis at the time the project was contributed to the partnership2 4' 3 The successful use of a partnership to
accomplish the conversion of the entire mortgage results in the developer's having no basis after the conversion, but the developer
will have avoided recognizing gain as a result of the conversion except to the extent of its prior tax losses and cash withdrawals from
the mortgage financing.4 If the entire mortgage is converted, the
lender will have a basis equal to the amount contributed to convert
the mortgage.24
3. Operations After Conversion. After the conversion of all or
part of the mortgage, the ownership and operation of the project
generally should be subject to the normal rules governing partners
owning real property jointly, with the parties' respective bases in
the project dependent upon the manner in which the conversion
was accomplished. There is a possible problem in this regard, however, to the extent that the mortgage is only partially converted. In
that event, it is possible that the unconverted portion of the mortgage would be deemed to constitute an equity capital contribution,

241. The deemed distribution would occur as a result of the reduction in the developer's proportionate share of the liability to which the project is subject. This deemed distribution would reduce the developer's basis to $2,500,000. See I.R.C. § 733.
242. See id. § 752(b). This deemed distribution would further reduce the developer's
basis by $2,500,000, or to $0. See id. § 733.
243. See note 240 supra.
244. The prior losses and withdrawals would have reduced the developer's basis,
thereby making the mortgage-in-excess of basis rules applicable. See note 240 supra.
245. See I.R.C. § 722.
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resulting in a further reduction of the developer's basis, potential
benefits attributed to tax losses, and tax-free distributions after
the partial conversion2. 6

D.

Analysis of Purchase Option Arrangement

A purchase option arrangement is one in which the participating
lender does not own an interest in the project at the outset but has
a right to acquire an ownership interest in the project for additional consideration.
1. Operations Prior to Exercise of Option. The operations of
the project prior to the time the lender exercises its option to acquire an interest in the project should not be affected by the existence of the option. The fact that the lender has a right to become
a joint owner of the project, and presumably a partner of the developer, should not cause the lender's mortgage financing to constitute equity capital for purposes of reducing the developer's basis.
Accordingly, prior to the exercise of the option, the developer
should be treated as the sole owner of the project for tax
47
purposes.
2. Tax Effects of Exercising Option. When the developer conveys an interest in the project directly to the lender upon the exercise of the purchase option, the transaction will be treated as a sale
of an interest in the project. Consequently, the developer will recognize gain to the extent that the sum of the percentage of the
mortgage equal to the ownership percentage conveyed to the
lender plus the option price paid by the lender exceeds the developer's proportionate basis in the ownership percentage conveyed to
the lender. 248 Assuming that the developer's basis in the project is
246. The developer would be able to deduct its allocable share of the venture's losses
and receive initially tax-free distributions only to the extent of its basis. See id. §§ 704(d),
731(a)(1).
247. See note 233 supra. The same general considerations would apply in the determination of whether the developer or the lender was the owner of the project for tax purposes
prior to exercise of the option as would apply in connection with a convertible mortgage
prior to a conversion.
248. For example, assume that the mortgage is $5,000,000, the developer's basis is
$5,000,000 and the lender's option is to acquire a 50% interest in the project upon payment
of $1,000,000 to the developer. The conveyance by the developer of a 50% interest in the
project will reduce the developer's basis by 50%, or $2,500,000, which is the amount of the
developer's basis attributable to the portion of the project being conveyed. The $1,000,000
paid to the developer for the interest will be taxable in full, since its basis in the 50% being
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equal to the amount of the mortgage, the developer will recognize
gain only to the extent of the option price. If the developer's basis
is less than the amount of the mortgage, additional gain will have
to be recognized by the developer. " '
The developer may avoid recognizing gain with respect to the
amount by which the mortgage exceeds its basis by contributing
the project to a partnership comprised of the developer and lender

in lieu of conveying an interest in the project directly to the lender.
In that event, the transaction might be treated, at least partially,

as a return of basis, with the developer required to recognize gain
with respect to the mortgage in excess of the basis only in the unlikely event that the reduction in the developer's share of the
liability for the mortgage exceeded its basis in the project prior to
the formation of the partnership.2 5 0
The formation of a partnership, as described above, probably
will not allow the developer to avoid recognizing gain with respect
to the option price paid by the lender. If the option price is contributed by the lender to the partnership and then distributed to
the developer, it is likely that the Service would apply the provisions of the regulations under section 731 of the Code to recast at
least that part of the transaction as a sale of an interest in the
project directly to the lender."' In that event, the Service might

conveyed is, at that point, $0.
249. If the developer's basis in the example set forth in note 248, supra, were
$4,500,000 (as a result of, e.g., withdrawals or construction period losses), the portion of that
basis attributable to the interest conveyed would be $2,250,000, resulting in a $250,000 noncash gain to the developer in addition to the $1,000,000 gain from the sale.
250. In the example contained in note 249 supra, if the developer contributed the project to a 50-50 venture, there would be a deemed distribution upon contribution of
$2,500,000 (one-half of the mortgage), thereby reducing the developer's basis to $2,000,000.
See I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 733. The lender's $1,000,000 cash contribution, if withdrawn by the
developer, theoretically would be tax free under section 731 since the contribution would
not exceed its basis. See id. § 731(a). The contribution, however, would reduce the developer's basis to $1,000,000. See id. § 733. See Otey v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir.
1980). In that case, the court affirmed the Tax Court's opinion holding that the contribution
of property to a partnership, followed a short time later by a withdrawal of funds in an
amount approximately equal to the market value of the property contributed was not a sale.
The case differs from the typical lender-developer transaction, however, in that there were
no other contributions to the capital at the time the withdrawal was made, and the funds
withdrawn were the proceeds of a loan. Id. at 1047.
251. See Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3). But see Otey v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th
Cir. 1980). The Otey case differs from the factual situation presented because of the significant capital contribution of the lender. See generally 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
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also seek to recast the entire transaction, resulting in additional
gain to the developer with respect to the amount by which the
mortgage exceeds its basis.' 2"
3. Operations After Option is Exercised. Unless the lender's
mortgage is treated as an equity capital contribution after the
purchase option is exercised, the subsequent operations of the project should be subject to the general rules regarding partners owning real property jointly, with their respective bases dependent
upon the manner in which the purchase option was consummated
and treated for tax purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Equity participation arrangements between institutional lenders
and real estate developers increasingly are becoming common.
Much of the continuing activity in the real estate industry is attributable to the ability of lenders and developers to reach agreements of this sort, thereby mitigating the adverse impact which
inflation has had on traditional methods of obtaining mortgage
financing for real estate projects. Equity participations, however,
do present significant areas of concern for both parties. Therefore,
such arrangements should be utilized with due appreciation for the
tax and other legal risks involved.

14.08 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
252. See note 249 supra.
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